Labour Inspection and Undeclared Work in the EU by International Labor Organization
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
International Publications Key Workplace Documents 
2013 
Labour Inspection and Undeclared Work in the EU 
International Labor Organization 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in International Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Labour Inspection and Undeclared Work in the EU 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Within the ILO/EC framework of cooperation, this comparative study on Labour Inspection 
Strategies for Combatting Undeclared Work was carried out during the biennium 2012-13. The study was 
coordinated by the ILO, Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (LAB/ADMIN) in cooperation 
with EC Unit EMPL-B2/Labour Law. The purpose of this study was to consider the role that national labour 
inspection systems in the EU have as part of a strategic policy response to undeclared work. 
Keywords 
undeclared work, European Union, labor inspection, employment 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
International Labor Organization. (2013). Labour inspection and undeclared work in the EU (LAB/ADMIN 
Working Document No. 29). Geneva: Author. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/275 

  
Working Document Number 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour Inspection and Undeclared Work 
in the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EC Project GLO/12/24/EEC, Labour Inspection Strategies for combatting 
undeclared work in Europe 
 
Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (LAB/ADMIN) 
International Labour Organization – Geneva 
 
 ii 
Copyright © International Labour Organization 2013 
First Published 2013 
 
Publications of the International Labour Office enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. 
Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. For 
rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to the ILO Publications (Rights and Permissions) International 
Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland, or by e-mail: pubdroit@ilo.org. The International Labour Office welcomes 
such applications.  
The libraries, institutions and other users registered in a reproduction rights organization may make photocopies in accordance 
with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Information on the organization of reproduction rights in your country are 
posted on www.ifrro.org. 
  
 
ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data 
Labour inspection and undeclared work in the EU / International Labour Office, Labour Administration 
and Inspection Programme (LAB/ADMIN). - Geneva: ILO, 2013 
Working document, No. 29, ISSN 2227-7560 
International Labour Office; Labour Administration and Inspection Programme 
clandestine employment / labour inspection / labour administration / role of ILO / EU countries 
13.01.3 
 
 
The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of 
material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office 
concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. 
The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and 
publication does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office of the opinions expressed in them.  
Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the International 
Labour Office, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval.  
ILO publications can be obtained through major booksellers or ILO local offices in many countries, or direct from ILO 
Publications, International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland. Catalogues or lists of new publications are available 
free of charge from the above address, or by email: pubvente@ilo.org. 
Visit our website: www.ilo.org/publns. 
 
 
 
Printed in Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
Table of Contents 
 
Preface ............................................................................................................................................. v 
Undeclared Work in the European Union ............................................................................. v 
Labour inspection and undeclared work .............................................................................. vi 
1. Nature, size and scope of undeclared work in the EU .......................................................... 1 
1.1. Conceptual approach ................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Facts and figures ......................................................................................................... 7 
1.3. Scope ......................................................................................................................... 14 
2. Governments responses to undeclared work ....................................................................... 21 
3. Tackling undeclared work through the labour inspection system ....................................... 23 
3.1. The role of labour inspectorates ................................................................................ 23 
3.2. Labour inspection planning experiences for undeclared work ................................. 25 
3.3. Labour inspection strategies and methods for undeclared work ............................... 27 
3.4. Tools and technical support for labour inspectors .................................................... 31 
3.5. Training programs for labour inspectors ................................................................... 34 
4. Preventive approaches to undeclared work ......................................................................... 36 
4.1. Incentives for compliance ......................................................................................... 36 
4.2. Preventive measures of labour inspection ................................................................. 39 
4.3. Sanctions for undeclared work.................................................................................. 41 
5. Cooperation and collaboration experiences .............................................................. 45 
5.1. Cooperation with other administrative authorities .................................................... 45 
5.2. Relations with the judiciary ...................................................................................... 50 
5.3. Collaboration with social partners ............................................................................ 52 
5.4. Cross border cooperation .......................................................................................... 54 
6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 57 
7. Recommendations for strengthening labour inspection in combatting undeclared 
work .......................................................................................................................... 61 
Annex I – Recommendations for follow up – Round-table discussion on Labour Inspection 
practices for combatting undeclared work .................................................................................... 63 
Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... 67 
Selected bibliography .................................................................................................................... 69 

 v 
Preface 
Within the ILO/EC framework of cooperation, this comparative study on Labour 
Inspection Strategies for Combatting Undeclared Work was carried out during the 
biennium 2012-13. The study was coordinated by the ILO, Labour Administration and 
Inspection Programme (LAB/ADMIN) in cooperation with EC Unit EMPL-B2/Labour 
Law. The purpose of this study was to consider the role that national labour inspection 
systems in the EU have as part of a strategic policy response to undeclared work.  
Undeclared Work in the European Union 
The European Commission has highlighted that undeclared work, if not properly 
confronted, threatens to undermine the EU’s ability to meet its employment targets for 
more and better jobs and stronger growth. Undeclared work is a form of social dumping 
that introduces unfair competition between firms on the basis of low wages and the non-
payment of social security benefits. Above all, it leads to working situations that violate 
the rights and dignity of workers. In this regard, the ILO, like the EC, emphasizes the need 
to encourage transitions from informal to formal work as a prerequisite for achieving 
decent work.  
The ILO’s approach to undeclared work is situated in the context of the broader 
notion of the informal economy, which it defines as “all economic activities by workers 
and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered, or insufficiently covered, 
by formal arrangements.” This definition includes the notion of undeclared work as 
understood by the EC, while also covering workers who sometimes fall outside the 
coverage of labour legislation (e.g. domestic or agricultural workers). 
While these formulations are widely known, the exact legal definition of undeclared 
work often varies from one country to the next. This has important implications for the 
enforcement of regulations on undeclared work by labour inspectors (especially in the 
cross-border context). 
Undeclared work is a complex phenomenon with a myriad of attributes and causes. 
Any attempt to counter this pattern of employment requires an equally sophisticated and 
balanced approach between preventive measures and law enforcement. The European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions notes that while the 
approach to undeclared work in EU Member States is still mostly focused on deterrence, 
there has been a noticeable shift in efforts to transform undeclared work into formal 
employment and even prevent people from taking up undeclared work in the first place. 
In general, undeclared work in Europe remains inherently difficult to measure. This 
poses difficulties for policy makers and in particular labour inspectorates as they try to 
better understand the phenomenon of undeclared work in all of its aspects and develop 
tailored policies and improved inspection practices for preventing, reducing or at the very 
least monitoring the incidence of undeclared labour. The common challenge governments 
face in reducing undeclared work and ensuring conditions of decent work for undeclared 
workers, speaks to the need for shared policy guidelines among labour inspectorates across 
the EU. 
Tackling undeclared work requires a number of coordinated steps on the part of 
governments and public institutions. To begin, governments in Europe need to pursue 
policies that will at the same time reduce the incentives for employers to use undeclared 
work and for workers to engage in such activities. This is the broader policy picture that, if 
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successful, can help relieve the burden on detection and enforcement measures, which, on 
their own, will likely prove less successful at changing the patterns and prevalence of 
undeclared work. 
Prior to the introduction of the EC’s Employment Guideline No. 9, the most 
widespread approach to addressing undeclared work was through punishing infractions 
through greater detection efforts as opposed to penalties. With the adoption of Guideline 
No. 9, prevention measures in addition to efforts to punish non-compliance have become 
more commonplace, as have efforts to enable greater compliance. Measures to improve 
compliance, however, are largely confined to northern EU Member States. Even with more 
widespread efforts to boost compliance, such efforts are still mainly observed in the 
original EU 15 countries. New EU countries have instead shown a preference for measures 
to detect and punish non-compliance with regulations on undeclared work. What these 
developments reveal is that countries are no longer relying as heavily on deterrence but are 
expanding their policy responses to include both carrots and sticks.  
Labour inspection and undeclared work 
Labour inspectorates are important allies for dealing with the problem of undeclared 
work, even though they commonly lack the necessary resources, tools, procedures and 
coordination with other relevant authorities to prevent, identify and remedy such cases. 
Improving the application and enforcement of workers’ rights and protections through 
more robust and responsive labour inspection action remains a necessary and important 
part of addressing undeclared work. The approach that inspection services take depends 
largely on the national context. In some countries, particularly in new EU Member States 
where undeclared work is widespread within the formal economy, a broader strategy may 
be required. In other countries where undeclared work is more specifically a structural 
problem, more targeted measures would be suitable.  
Whatever the circumstances, inspectors need to have a good knowledge of existing 
national regulations so as to better identify and deal with situations of undeclared work. 
For this, inspectors need to be properly trained. Moreover, the planning and practice of 
inspection visits should be reassessed to ensure that adequate attention is paid to the 
incidence of undeclared work, even in situations where a visit’s primary objective is not to 
detect undeclared activities. In addition, countries can take advantage of the educational or 
promotional function of labour inspectorates to increase awareness among businesses and 
workers about the rules on undeclared work and how such situations can be avoided or 
regularized. In this regard, inspectorates have a valuable role in the prevention and 
transformation of undeclared work and should not simply be viewed as enforcers handing 
out fines and penalties. 
The ILO notes that the credibility of any inspectorate depends to a large extent on its 
ability to advise employers and workers on the most effective means of complying with the 
legal provisions within its remit in all areas. However, it also depends on the existence and 
implementation of a sufficiently efficient labour inspection system. 
Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 81 on Labour Inspection calls for the protection of 
all type of workers, including vulnerable workers. Moreover, Article 7 of ILO Convention 
No. 150 on Labour Administration recommends extending the functions of labour 
administration, which includes labour inspection, to groups of workers who are not 
employed persons according to national laws. 
This comparative study aims at filling the gap of knowledge within labour 
inspectorates on how to deal effectively against fraud, informal economy problems and 
undeclared work. The results of the study have been summed up with a set of Conclusions 
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and Recommendations that should inspire future research work and action in this delicate 
area. 
It is our hope that the current comparative study would assist policy makers to better 
understand the factors for improving their own labour inspection systems by offering a 
review of selected national good practices and strategies for combatting undeclared work. 
In this regard, the national studies can be consulted on the ILO/LAB/ADMIN webpage. 
Many thanks to all those who have contributed to this study: 
Mr Giuseppe Casale, Director, ILO-LAB/ADMIN; Ms Maria Luz Vega, Senior 
Labour Administration/Inspection Specialist, ILO-LAB/ADMIN; Mr Joaquim Pintado 
Nunes, Labour Administration/Inspection Specialist, ILO-LAB/ADMIN; Mr Mario Fasani, 
Technical Officer, ILO-LAB/ADMIN; Ms Caroline Augé, Administrative Assistant, ILO-
LAB/ADMIN; Ms Susan Bvumbe, Administrative Assistant, ILO-LAB/ADMIN; 
Mr Armindo Silva, Director, European Commission, EMPL.B, Employment and Social 
Legislation, Social Dialogue; Ms Muriel Guin, Head of Unit, EU Labour Law, EMPL.B.2, 
DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion; Ms Carita Rammus, Legal Officer, EU 
Labour Law, EMPL.B.2, DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion; Mr Arsenio 
Fernandez Rodriguez, SLIC Secretary – Policy Officer, Heath, Safety and Hygiene at 
Work, EMPL.B.3, DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion; Mr Gianni Arrigo, 
Professor of Labour Law, Universita degli Studi di Bari, ITALY; Ms Daniela Bertino, 
Former Manager of Labour Administration, Inspection and Social Dialogue, ITC/ILO-
Turin, ITALY; Mr Stefano Caffio, Senior Labour Inspector, Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy – Provincial Labour Directorate of Matera, ITALY; Mr André Cano, Former 
Director, INTEFP, FRANCE; Ms Maedhbh Cronin, Independent Consultant, IRELAND; 
Mr Padraig Dooley, Deputy Director, Responsible for the management of all of NERA’s 
operations, IRELAND; Ms Vera Gaiola, Labour Inspector, Authority for Working 
Conditions (ACT), PORTUGAL; Mr Dariusz Górski, Specialist, Legality of Employment 
Department, National Labour Inspectorate, POLAND; Mr Manuel Velázquez Fernandez, 
Head of the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate of Biscay, SPAIN; Mr Michael 
Kandarakis, Former Executive Secretary, Greek Labour Inspectorate (SEPE), GREECE; 
Mr Pablo Paramo Montero, Head of Team Labour Inspection, Ministry of Employment 
and Social Security, SPAIN; Mr Pedro Nuno Pimenta Braz, General Inspector, Authority 
for Working Conditions (ACT), PORTUGAL; Mr Piet Renooy, Regioplan Policy 
Research, the NETHERLANDS; Ms Silvia Trufasila, Independent expert, Asbtconsulting 
SRL, ROMANIA; Mr Philippe Vanden Broeck, General-Advisor, Ministry of Labour, 
Labour Inspectorate, BELGIUM; Mr Daniel Xirau, Head of the European and International 
Actions Mission, INTEFP, FRANCE. 
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1. Nature, size and scope of undeclared 
work in the EU 
1.1. Conceptual approach 
Fighting against undeclared work has been an important policy issue in OECD and in 
particular EU countries during the last decades. Given the variety of forms that fraudulent 
behaviors intending to evade tax and social obligations assume, and the difficulties on 
identifying and measuring the exact dimension of the hidden labour economy, all 
conceptual attempts looking for a uniform approach to the problem are especially 
challenging. In the last years, the EU institutions and Member States have been 
considering social fraud mainly under the perspective of undeclared work1, even though 
the term implies understandings and notions at national and international level that are 
quite heterogeneous. 
From a general point of view, the term undeclared work is considered prima facie one 
of the structural parts of the shadow economy. However, it should be noted that also the 
shadow economy may be defined in a variety of ways,2 as highlighted in a recent study.3 
The shadow economy is viewed as an aggregate of economic activity results not 
included into officially documented Gross National Product4 or “those economic activities 
and the income derived forms that circumvent or otherwise avoid government regulation, 
taxation or observation.”5 This definition also covers the cases pertaining to unregulated 
economy (e.g. activity unrelated to breach of legislation; activity of economic operators, 
which is not-required to be registered) as well as aspects of criminal activities (e.g. legally 
prohibited actions, such as production and sale of narcotic substances, smuggling and 
theft).6 
The notion of “undeclared work” is also defined in very different ways and is often 
used together with other labour market terminology, sometimes as a synonymous of illegal 
                                                     
1See among others: Eurofound (2008), Tackling undeclared work in the European Union, 
Eurofound, Dublin, available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2008/13/en/1/ef0813-
en.pdf. 
Eurofound (2009), Measures to tackle undeclared work in the European Union, Eurofound, Dublin, 
available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2009/25/en/1/EF0925EN.pdf. 
European Commission (2007), Stepping up the fight against undeclared work COM(2007) 628 
final, European Commission, Brussel. 
2Startiene, G., & Trimonis, K. (2009). The Size of Non-Observed Economy. Ekonomika ir vadyba-
Economics and Management 14, 976-983. 
3Schneider. F. and Williams, C. The Shadow Economy, 2013, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). 
Wenmister. London. 
4Schneider, F. & Enste, D. H. (2002). The Shadow Economy: An International Survey. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
5Schenider, F. and Willians. Op. cit., p. 3. 
6
 Rosser, J. B. (2006). Book’s (Schneider, F. Enste, D. Shadow Economy: An International Survey) 
Review [accessed 24 April 2008]. 
Available from Internet: http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb/book.rev.schneider&enste.doc. 
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work, irregular work, illegal employment, unregistered employment, hidden 
unemployment, “black” labour, etc, even though their content can be fundamentally 
different, and varied. For example, from —aiming to determine the portion of the 
employed not reflected in statistical reports due to a variety of reasons— the terms 
“informal employment” or “unregistered employment” are both used. Illegal work is used 
in many countries to refer either to a broader notion, such as in France, or to the undeclared 
work conducted by individuals with an irregular status, migrant workers without a work or 
residence permit, (for example, in Greece or Cyprus). 
Other concepts such as “informal employment” are more frequently used in applied 
research, wherein it is defined as the number of people working in the informal labour 
market, as the illegal purchase and sale of labour force without an employment contract 
and ignoring laws that regulate labour relations.  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, different studies (mainly addressing the 
phenomenon from the point of view of tax non-compliance) used different terms to address 
this complex phenomenon in Europe (the most frequently used terms are “undeclared 
work” and “illegal work”).  
The difficulties of achieving a common definition or understanding result from the 
fact that undeclared work is a complex, heterogeneous phenomenon that forms part of an 
even more complex reality, (the informal economy),7 which can be also defined in a 
variety of ways.8 
The discussion on undeclared work is very much connected to the debate on the 
informal economy as a part of the economy that is hidden from the relevant authorities. 
Originally the notion of the informal economy derives from the literature on socio 
economic issues of developing countries. Researchers determined that large groups of the 
population in those countries were not absorbed in the modern economy. In 1963, Clifford 
Geertz9 introduced two terms for this phenomenon: the “firm-centered economy” and the 
bazaar economy. The “firm-centered economy” was characterized by an efficient conduct 
of business, high productivity and the use of substantial quantities of capital and 
technology. The “bazaar economy” was characterized by low productivity, intensive 
labour and low capital intensity, low incomes and a high capacity for absorption 
(involution). Furthermore, it was not officially registered by the authorities (e.g. tax 
authorities, Chamber of Commerce). 
                                                     
7
 Defined by the ILO as “all economic activities by workers and economic units that are –in law or 
in practice– not covered, or insufficiently covered, by formal arrangements” (ILC 2002, Decent 
Work and the informal economy, http://www.ilo.org/publabour inspection/english/standards/-
relm/ilc/ilc90/). The term, as mentioned in ILO’s Resolution concerning decent work and the 
informal economy adopted in the 90th ILC session, 2002, accommodates both wage and own-
account workers lacking protection, rights and representation. 
8
 Startiene, G., & Trimonis, K. (2009). Op. cited. 
9
 See reference in Geertz, C. (1978). The bazaar economy: Information and Search in peasant 
marketing: Papers and proceedings of the ninetieth annual meeting of the American economic 
association. The American Economic Review, 68(2), 28-32. Retrieved from 
http://prelim2009.filmbulletin.org/readings/10-Economic_Sociology/Geertz.pdf. 
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Elaborating on this dualistic model, Hart10 introduced the terms formal and informal 
in his study on the employment structure in Accra, Ghana. With the ILO report on the 
Kenyan economy and a series of World Bank studies in the seventies, the two terms took 
root in the debate on economic development.11 
Although the informal economy became a common notion, clear-cut definitions were 
never agreed. The ILO perspectives evolved from the notion of informal sector as defined 
in the report of the Director-General to the ILC (1991)12 to the broader concept of informal 
economy (see note 7). 
In this context, undeclared work refers to underground or hidden labour, clandestine 
employment, “black” labour, moonlighting or illegal work. These terms are for the most 
part used in industrialized countries and refer to different types of work whose activities 
are covered by labour law, but are not in conformity with its requirements or avoid 
complying with administrative obligations. For example, workers are paid below the 
minimum wage, employers do not register workers with the social security authorities, 
taxes and social security contributions are not paid on employment earnings or wage 
workers unlawfully accumulating work earnings with unemployment, sickness or accident 
social benefits.  
According to the EC’s Communication 98/219,13 undeclared work refers to “paid 
activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities, 
bearing in mind that difference in the regulatory system of Member States must be taken 
into account.”14 This definition excludes criminal activities from the scope of undeclared 
work. It also excludes work which does not have to be declared to public authorities, such 
as work in the household economy or voluntary work. Consequently, the “only difference 
between undeclared and declared work is that undeclared work is not declared to the 
authorities for tax, social security or labour law purposes.”15  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposes a 
similar definition, using the term ‘hidden employment’ to refer to work, “which although 
not illegal in itself, has not been declared to one or more administrative authorities.”16 
 
                                                     
10
 Hart, K. (1973), Informal economy opportunities and the urban employment in Ghana. In Journal 
of Modern Africa Studies, Vol. 11, no.1. 
11
 Transitioning from the informal to the formal economy, Report of the Director-general, 
International Labour Conference, 103 Session, 2014, Geneva.  
12
 The dilemma of the informal sector, Report of the Director-general, International Labour 
Conference, 78th session, Geneva. 
13
 Communication from the Commission (98) 219 final, 7 April 1998. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Eurofund (2013). Tackling undeclared work in 27 European Union Member States and Norway. 
Approaches and measures since 2008. Eurofund Dublin available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ef13243.htm. 
16
 OECD Employment Outlook, 2004. 
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According to the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions,17 the definition of undeclared work definition covers diverse paid activities 
ranging from informal domestic services to clandestine activity conducted by illegal 
residents. For analytical purposes, three broad types of undeclared work are distinguished: 
• undeclared work within a formal or informal enterprise, or what might be termed 
undeclared waged employment. This can be either wholly undeclared, where all 
one’s wages are paid ‘off the books’, or partially undeclared, where a portion of 
the wage from one’s formal employer is paid officially and a portion off the books 
(‘envelope wages’); 
• own-account undeclared work for an enterprise or another client such as a 
household, conducted in a similar way to self-employment; and 
• more socially embedded own-account undeclared work, delivering goods and 
services directly to consumers who are neighbours, kin, friends or acquaintances. 
The ILO’s approach to undeclared work has been usually in the context of the already 
mentioned broader notion of informal economy. It includes the notion of undeclared work 
as understood by the EC, while also covering workers who sometimes fall outside of the 
coverage of labour legislation. As mentioned above, some types of informal work are not 
subdued to declaration, such as activities with economic expression but not remunerated 
within the family or proximity networks (for example, the neighbours that get together to 
help each other during harvest or to paint a house, or the relative that helps to take care of 
the elderly) and thus, will not be considered as undeclared work. Nonetheless, avoidance 
of labour law requirements and social fraud is present in many apparent non remunerated 
activities like false occupational status (bogus self-employment, internships, volunteering) 
and demand from national authorities a constant surveillance on what is to be declared and 
taxed on the basis of the reality of the facts.18 
From a labour law perspective, undeclared work is usually considered as a work 
without a labour contract between an employee and an employer or in breach of its terms 
and conditions, namely in what refers to registration obligations. Undeclared work is, as 
so, a legal payable activity, which is either unregistered or its results are concealed from 
the state institutions in order to avoid taxes or use tax advantages in breach of legislative 
acts regulating employment relations. It should be noted that only the cases on which the 
state institutions have no information (or such information is insufficient when compared 
to data on official work) regarding avoidance of taxes and social insurance contributions 
are attributed to undeclared work. When state institutions have no information on a 
specific employment case because it is considered to be a legislated against and concealed 
(e.g. producing and distributing legally prohibited goods), it is criminal activity and not 
undeclared work,19 in line with the definition of the EC. 
 
 
                                                     
17
 Eurofund 2012 op cit. page 3. 
18
 See Bignami R., Casale G., Fasani M., (2013) Labour inspection and the employment 
relationship, Working Document No. 28, LAB/ADMIN, ILO, Geneva.  
19
 Williams, C. C. (2009a). Case of Envelope Wages in the European Union. International Journal of 
Sociology, 39(2), 39-59. 
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While these formulations are generally accepted, the exact legal definition of 
undeclared work often varies from one country to the next. This has important implications 
for the enforcement of regulations on undeclared work by labour inspectors. To take two 
examples, German law tolerates a large amount of informal paid work that takes place in 
the home or between acquaintances; such work is not considered to be undeclared nor is it 
sanctioned. By contrast in Denmark, undeclared work covers a broader field of labour 
transactions and includes any type of productive activity paid in cash or in kind that is not 
declared.20 
Moreover, depending on the country,21 the focus on undeclared work might be 
different, which is reflected in the use of distinct definitions and policies. For instance, in 
some countries where there is a legal requirement to have written employment contracts 
and to register them, undeclared work means in principle work performed without a 
written employment contract.22 In other cases, the notion of legal work is defined but not 
the notion of illegal or undeclared work. Undeclared work might be described in law as a 
subcategory of the broader term of illegal work; or perhaps the term is paraphrased, 
enumerating different categories of workers or scenarios that are considered illegal under 
the law.23 In some cases, there is no official definition at all.24 
In fact, domestic legislation of most of the countries does not provide a definition of 
“undeclared work”, and governments rather refer to the notion as stated by the EC COM 
(98) 219.25 However, labour codes and social security laws generally cover the main issues 
related to undeclared work, such as the obligation of declaring new workers, the criteria to 
determine the employment relationship against commercial contracts, requirements for 
hiring workers based on minimum age, legal status in the country and certification for 
certain occupations, etc. Legal provisions on minimum wages, employment agencies, 
working time, holidays with pay, and others also provide useful references and tools for 
labour inspectors, helping to define minimum standards applicable to all workers and thus 
entitling labour inspectorates to reinstate workers on their rights, in application of the laws. 
Difficulties still arise, though, from the lack of clarity or ambiguity of some facts, where it 
is difficult to distinguish the border between what is to be considered waged work or what 
is to be declared. 
In some countries, though, the law provides definitions of what is to be considered 
undeclared work, even if included under broader legal definitions. This is the case of 
Lithuania, where undeclared work is part of the current concept of illegal work as defined 
                                                     
20
 Pfau-Effinger, Brigit. Varieties of undeclared work in European societies, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 47, 1 March 2009, pp. 79-99. 
21
 All the references on this paper without identification of source were gathered from national 
studies commissioned by the ILO and two round-tables organized with labour inspectorates from 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain in 
Brussels on 29 April 2013 and Geneva on 10 and 11 July 2013. 
22
 Latvia, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. . 
23
 France, Poland. 
24
 E.g. Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom. 
25
 For instance, Art. 32(7) of the Greek Bill No. 3996/2011 uses exactly the same definition. 
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in the Labour Code.26 A similar broad definition is used in Germany.27 In Belgium, illegal 
employment is all work done in contravention to social legislation under the competence of 
federal authorities.28 In the Czech Republic, the Act on Employment No. 435/2004 
considers illegal work where a natural person does not work for a legal or natural entity on 
the basis of a labour law relationship or another contract, except in the case of the natural 
person’s spouse or child, or where the worker performs work in breach of an employment 
permit issued or without such a permit.  
France uses the term “illegal employment” (L. L821 of Labour Code) to cover: 
a) “Concealed labour”, as an activity intentionally hidden to avoid payments of taxes 
or social contributions; 
b) Bogus self-employment; 
c) Illegal accumulation of employment relations; 
d) Fraud in connection with social benefits; 
e) Illicit supply of workers, and human trafficking; 
f) Irregular employment of foreigners. 
A precise legal definition of undeclared work is considered by many observers as a 
problematic one. This would explain the absence of such definition as based on the 
deliberate decision of policy makers to avoid potential gaps in the application of the law, 
thereby avoiding a policy approach that is too reductive. On the other hand, a too broad 
definition might obscure the purpose of a definition on undeclared work, namely the 
protection of undeclared workers, since non-declaration makes them vulnerable and 
deprives them of their legitimate rights. There is also the risk of confounding undeclared 
work with social or fiscal fraud, rather than putting an emphasis on the protection of 
workers’ rights. Disparities on legislation exist even in areas regulated by the European 
Union, like posting of workers, where studies reveal differences in the transposition and its 
practical effects,29 depending on factors such as the importance of collective agreements 
compared to the law or the level of details provided by these agreements. For instance, the 
Irish legislation does not have a precise reference to the mandatory existence of a labour 
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 Art. 98 of the Labour Code approved by Law No. IX-926 of 4 June 2002, amended by Law No. 
XI-394 of 22 July 2009 defines illegal work as the work: 1. ‘performed without the conclusion of an 
employment contract although the characteristics of an employment contract are present’ (an 
employment contract is defined by the LC as ‘an agreement between an employee and an employer 
whereby the employee undertakes to perform work of a certain profession, speciality, qualification 
or to perform specific duties in accordance with the work regulations established at the workplace, 
whereas the employer undertakes to provide the employee with the work specified in the contract, to 
pay him the agreed wage and to ensure working conditions as set in labour laws, other regulatory 
acts, the collective agreement and by agreement between the parties’); or 2. ‘performed by foreign 
citizens and stateless persons failing to comply with the procedure of their employment established 
by regulatory acts’. 
27
 Illegal Employment is defined as working on a freelancing or employed basis for money and 
without the statutory registrations and announcements (Illegal Employment Combat Act 2004). 
28
 Social Penal Code, Article 1, § 1. 
29
 Cremens, 2011. 
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contract previous to the posting in the origin country, which creates difficulties for 
enforcement. 
The diversity of approaches to undeclared work across Europe exists partly because 
of the complex nature of undeclared work and the diversity of actors who take part in it, 
different from one country to the next, but also because of legal and policy options. The 
intricacy, dispersion and sometimes bottlenecks of legislation related to labour and social 
fraud are a test for many inspectorates, for which investigation of cases, gathering of 
evidence and legal interpretation of possible offenses can consume several months of 
work, rendering labour inspection inefficient. The nature of the cases is quite diversified. 
For instance, in some countries non-declaration mostly takes the form of concealing wages 
as in other cases the hiring of undeclared workers who continue to receive unemployment 
benefits or even enterprises who sell “entitlements” to social benefits will be more 
common.30 In other countries, the practice of employing workers without valid work 
permits is a major concern,31 in addition to false independent work32 and other bogus 
employment status like labour contracts with young workers disguised as internships. A 
more detailed exemplification of cases will be described below. 
Overall, the quality of legislation is a relevant factor influencing the capacities of 
labour inspectorates to tackle undeclared work. A particular problem for labour inspectors, 
for instance, is the deadline for registration of workers in social security. In countries like 
Romania, deadlines for registration make it difficult for inspectors to prove the duration of 
an employment relationship. As reported by labour inspectorates, when the deadline is too 
flexible, the outcomes of inspection visits are quite narrow, as non-compliant employers 
are able to register the worker after inspection without incurring any kind of penalty. On 
the contrary, simplification of procedures can help labour inspectors. When there is an 
option of declaring the worker online, by text message or fax, for instance, businesses are 
offered better public services and there will be no justifiable reason not to register workers. 
The lack of national legal definition leads in some cases to an increased difficulty for 
labour inspectorates to typify the cases to be considered as undeclared work and to some 
incoherence of legal approaches from different authorities or even the judiciary. In some 
countries, labour inspectors receive instructions on legal interpretation and protocols 
developed for the diverse cases they may encounter in work places (e.g. France, Italy, 
Spain33), but even on these cases harmonization with the dominant interpretation of courts 
remains a challenge, often leading to conflicting visions and contradictory application of 
the law. 
1.2. Facts and figures 
Undeclared work is influenced by a wide range of economic, social, institutional and 
cultural factors and appears as a particularly worrying feature of labour markets because of 
its individual, social and economic effects: 
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 Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria (information provided by governments). 
31
 France, Spain (national studies). 
32
 E.g. Belgium, Germany (national studies and information provided by the government). 
33
 National studies. 
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• at individual level, excludes workers from the protection of labour law and 
excludes them from the coverage of social security in case of disease, work 
accident, unemployment and age; 
• at social level, it constitutes an attempt against human rights and especially, decent 
working conditions and foments distributive injustice, as contributions for tax 
systems will be supported by some workers and enterprises while the others will 
be free riding most of the services offered by the State, without any or less onus; 
• at economic level, obstructs growth oriented policies, damages the State through 
lack of revenues, creating serious risks for the sustainability of the European social 
model, and induces unfair competition with a high risk of submersion, where 
compliant enterprises will lower their working standards to face competitors, 
passing from the declared to the undeclared economy. In a long term, it reduces 
quality of work, as well as quality of production and potential losses of national 
competitiveness in the global market. 
Effects of undeclared work for national revenues: the case of Belgium34 
In Belgium, a construction professional working 40 hours per week, receives a minimum wage of 2,240 
Euros (net of 1,440 Euros). 
When summing taxes and other mandatory costs to the wage (all supported by the employer), the total 
cost for this worker is the equivalent to 4,480 Euros. When calculating the taxes paid by both the 
employer and the worker, the State receives for each month of work around 3,040 Euros. 
If the worker is undeclared, this is the amount the State ceases to receive every month. In addition, for 
example, if the undeclared worker is receiving any kind of social allowance, the loss will be even higher. 
These effects cross also national boundaries. The same Belgium authorities report 
serious unfair competition from Polish international transport companies practicing social 
dumping and almost all of the countries involved in the national studies have reported 
similar problems with posted or cross-border workers in construction. 
Real losses for countries are difficult to estimate. Even if in the past decades a broad 
range of methods has been developed to assess the phenomenon of undeclared work in 
order to improve the understanding of its dimensions and causes, discussion regarding the 
“appropriate” methodology has still not come to an end. 
The studies “Undeclared labour in Europe”,35 “Undeclared work in an enlarged 
Europe”36 and “The European Employment Observatory review for Autumn 2004” 
included an overview of the subject,37 providing some of the first estimates of undeclared 
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 Adapted from national study. 
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 Mateman, S. and Renooy, P.H. (2001), Undeclared Labour in Europe: Towards an integrated 
approach of combating undeclared labour, Regioplan, Amsterdam. 
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 Renooy, P., Ivarsson, S., van der Wusten-Gritsai, O. and Meijer, R. (2004), Undeclared work in 
an enlarged union: an analysis of shadow work - an in-depth study of specific items, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
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 EUROFOUND (2004), Fighting the immeasurable? Addressing the phenomenon of undeclared 
work in the European Union. European Employment Observatory Review: Autumn 2004. European 
Commission, Luxembourg. Available at: 
www.eu-employment-observatory.net/resources/reviews/eeo_review_autumn2004_en.pdf. 
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work in the Member States, as well as insights into its character. In more recent years, with 
the aim of improving understanding of the extent and nature of undeclared work, both a 
direct survey (European Commission,38 and a review of indirect survey methods (GHK 
and Fondazione Brodolini, 2009)39 have been undertaken and yet many methods and 
scientific models are used (macro-economic models, surveys, analysis of administrative 
data, evaluation of national accounts, etc). 
Direct methods have been applied to determining the size of the informal economy at 
one particular point in time. An example is the survey method such as the Eurobarometer 
and the European Social Survey, which involve occasional or regular sample surveys 
where interviewees are asked certain questions about their employment relationship. 
These methods are complemented by indirect methods, such as the discrepancy 
method measuring companies’ incomes and consumption, and other methods analyzing 
labour market indicators. Econometric methods and statistical models use tools to estimate 
the undeclared economy as an “unobserved” variable influenced by certain causes 
(determinants) and influencing other variables. Once the determinants and the indicators 
are established, the relative extent and the development of undeclared work is calculated, 
with the aid of econometric modeling. Multiple causes multiple indicators models 
(MIMIC) or dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes (DYMIMIC) models40 are used. 
They take into account the multiple causes that determine the emergence and expansion of 
the underground economy and its multiple effects in time.41 
According to the MIMIC used by Schneider, in 2011, for instance, undeclared work 
represented 19, per cent of GDP in Europe though with large regional differences. Findings 
prove that in some European countries such as Bulgaria (32,3 per cent), Cyprus (25,8 per 
cent), Latvia (26,5 per cent), Lithuania (29 per cent), Poland (25 per cent) and Romania 
(29,5 per cent), the size of undeclared work is, in terms of the GDP, higher than in other 
European Union countries, like Austria (7,9 per cent), Belgium (17 per cent), France (13 
per cent), Germany (13,5 per cent), Ireland (12,7 per cent), Italy (19,4 per cent), the 
Netherlands (9,8 per cent) and Spain (17,6 per cent).42  
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 European Commission (2007b), Special Eurobarometer 284: undeclared work in the European 
Union, Brussels. 
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 GHK and Fondazione G. Brodolini (2009), Study on indirect measurement methods for 
undeclared work in the EU. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/Blobservlet?docld=456&-
lanld=en. 
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 The MIMIC (multiple indicators, multiple causes) or DYMIMIC models are statistical techniques 
consisting of observed and unobserved variables that have specification of causal relationships 
among the unobserved variables. It is assumed that the shadow economy remains an unobserved 
phenomenon (latent variable) which can be estimated using quantitatively measurable causes of 
illicit employment, e.g. tax burden and regulation intensity, and indicators reflecting illicit activities, 
e.g. currency demand, official GDP and official working time.  
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 For better description see: European Commission (2009), Study on indirect measurement methods 
for undeclared work in the EU- Final Report. Available at: 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4546&langId=en. 
42
 Schneider, F. (2012), Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 European and 5 other 
OECD countries from 2003 to 2012: some new facts. Available at  
http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/2012/ShadEcEurope31_March per 
cent202012.pdf. 
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The analysis using the same method shows a decline in the size of the undeclared 
economy from 22,3 per cent in 2003 to 18,4 per cent in 2012, whereas differences north-
south and east-west are still visible, with east-central and southern European Member 
States still taking the lead,43 differences going from 7,6 per cent in Austria to 31,9 per cent 
in Bulgaria. The estimates are confirmed by a recent EUROFUND 2013 study.44 It reveals 
that besides a slight rise between 2008 and 2009 across most of the EU 27, undeclared 
work continued to decline in size relative to the declared economy across all Member 
States between 2003 and 2012. The current economic crisis has not reversed the previous 
trend of an on-going incremental decline in the size of the undeclared economy as a 
proportion of GDP. Most of the Member States with relatively large undeclared economies 
in 2012 are either east central European or southern European Member States. Those with 
below-average undeclared economies, meanwhile, are largely west European and Nordic 
Member States. This, as already mentioned, signals a clear north-south and east-west 
divide within the EU concerning the relative size of the undeclared economy. 
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence can be inconclusive as well as the impact of the 
recent European crisis, as the estimated trends showing a uniform decline according to the 
econometric model 45 face a more varied picture, when compared to national studies or 
surveys, which reveal diverse figures.  
When using survey techniques, such as demonstrated by the direct survey conducted 
across the EU-27 in May and June 2007 only 5 per cent of the surveyed population 
declared having conducted undeclared work. In some countries, however, the participation 
rate is higher such as in Denmark (18 per cent), Estonia (11 per cent), Latvia (15 per cent), 
the Netherlands (13 per cent), and Sweden (10 per cent). The study also looked at the 
occupational status of European workers engaged in undeclared work. It turns out that the 
two most over-represented categories of undeclared workers were the unemployed and 
self-employed. 
When it comes to national studies, the figures also differ. For instance, a recent study 
of the Belgium national bank estimates that the shadow economy represents 3,8 per cent of 
the PIB, and that it is more developed in sectors producing for individuals (construction, 
retail, motor vehicle repair, food service industry,46 etc.).47  
As for the gender dimension, the European Commission revealed in 200748 that 
undeclared work is more common among men than women. While 6 per cent of the male 
population performed undeclared work in the previous 12 months, only 3 per cent of 
women did so. Almost two thirds (62 per cent) of all suppliers of undeclared work were 
men, except for Spain, France and Italy. Whereas in Spain and France, there was an almost 
equal ratio between men and women, in Italy, the latter predominate. In general, male 
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 Eurofound (2013), Tackling undeclared work in 27 European Union Member States and Norway: 
Approaches and measures since 2008, Eurofound, Dublin. 
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 See op cit. Eurofound (2013). 
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 Schneider, F., Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD 
Countries from 2003 to 2012: Some New Facts, Working Paper, 2012, p. 5. 
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 From now on referred to as Horeca. 
47
 National study. 
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 Special Eurobarometer 284 (2007), Undeclared Work in the European Union, European 
Commission. 
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undeclared workers were paid more than women (average earning for one hour of 
undeclared work of 19 and 12 Euros, respectively). 
It is not just the scale but also the structure of the shadow economy and more 
specifically of undeclared work that varies from one Member State to another; this is 
owing to differences in the productive structure and also in welfare state systems.49 The 
categories of workers most concerned by these phenomena, already worse off than 
average, are also affected by the recession and are seeing their income potential reduced.50 
The dynamics of the shadow economy and undeclared work, therefore, especially 
following the crisis, impact on the workforce in differing ways in the various Member 
States and also within individual economies. This diversity of impact must be taken 
properly into consideration in the shaping of policies to combat the shadow economy and 
when launching counter-cyclical social policies. 
Visits and other statistical indicators from labour inspectorates can help to gather 
some evidence, not so much on the extension of the phenomena but on its scope. Labour 
inspection statistics are a reliable source of information, but cannot provide a precise idea 
of the number of undeclared workers existing in a country, as the figures presented will 
result from the information gathered on inspection visits and will represent only a small 
part of the undeclared work force,51 considering that labour inspectorates have limited 
resources and only a small part of work places are visited. Estimations cannot also be 
purely based on figures reported by labour inspectorates because it is possible that their 
efforts were oriented to other areas than undeclared work and evidently, if so, the figures 
revealed for one year will be smaller than in comparative periods. Even so, crossing the 
data provided in labour inspection annual reports or extracted from labour inspectorates’ 
information systems with other sources is quite useful, as it gives empirical evidence very 
difficult to collect by using social sciences methods. 
Figures provided by labour inspectorates point out, in general terms, an increase of 
detected cases. In Italy, a total of 100,193 undeclared workers were identified in 2012, and 
over 295,000 workers were involved in any kind of undeclared paid activities (especially 
envelope wages) in the same period, representing a rise of 6 per cent when compared to 
2011. Out from 243,847 inspected businesses, 63 per cent were irregular. The amount 
recovered for social security was superior to 1,631,700,292 Euros, an increase of 33 per 
cent compared to 2011 (1,225,165,438 Euros). By sectors, construction was the 
predominant (61 per cent).  
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 In the Nordic countries where spending on labour market, social protection and redistribution 
policies is higher and where, as a result, there is greater equality in income, records show a lower 
incidence of undeclared work, which relates predominantly to people having second jobs to 
supplement their income. In southern Europe, on the other hand, the shadow economy plays a 
substitutive role owing to the limitations of active labour and welfare policies, and it is therefore 
particularly prevalent among the unemployed and people who are on the margins of the formal 
labour market. See Eurofound, Tackling undeclared work in 27 European Union Member States and 
Norway. Approaches and measures since 2008, June 2013, Chapters 1 and 4. 
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 Hazans, M., Informal Workers across Europe. Evidence from 30 European Countries, Policy 
Research Working Paper, No 5912, World Bank, December 2011, pp. 22-39. 
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 All figures and information presented in this paper without a specific reference to the source were 
extracted from a questionnaire launched by the ILO in 2009, studies commissioned by the ILO to 
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In Romania, the labour inspectorate also reported an increasing number of detected 
employers using undeclared work (9,731 in 2011 against 3,442 in 2004), the same 
applying for individuals without legal employment contracts (10,446 in 2004 against 
29,095 in 2011).  
Spain estimates that almost 50,000 workers covered by inspection visits were affected 
by violations related to undeclared work in 2012, 48,756 in 2011 and 50,839 in 2010. In 
total figures, the biggest number of infractions was found in hospitality (37 per cent of 
offenses), services (17 per cent) and commerce (14 per cent), but when considered relative 
rates between the number of inspections and identified violations, hospitality (17 per cent), 
agriculture (12 per cent) and industry (11 per cent) were the most represented sectors.52 
In what refers to the scope of undeclared work, evidence shows that it can be found in 
a wide range of workplaces (from micro businesses to large enterprises), in a variety of 
sectors (from services to construction, from industry to agriculture) and involving workers 
with different profiles and backgrounds (e.g. skilled and unskilled; men, women and 
children; nationals and migrants). Such heterogeneity makes undeclared work difficult to 
measure and monitor and helps explain the diverse legal approaches taken by different 
countries, as well as the need for labour inspectorates to carefully analyze patterns and set 
priorities. Sectors such as construction, horeca, hospitality, commerce and services are 
under constant surveillance of the labour inspectorates. For instance, in 2011, the Belgium 
ONEM did 2,857 controls of horeca enterprises and 9,281 workers, having found 1,594 
offenses affecting 1,950 workers.53 In France, more than 67,000 establishments were 
inspected by different social monitoring services, construction sites, horeca and agriculture 
were predominantly targeted (respectively 41 per cent, 24 per cent and 19 per cent of all 
controls). Results confirmed the need to maintain strict vigilance as 11,000 enterprises 
were irregularly employing workers, some 79 per cent undeclared, from which 11 per cent 
were foreign workers without work permit. In the same year, 9,000 warnings were issued 
on the subject. From around 1,000 sentences imposed by the courts, 25 per cent were 
related to undeclared work, with 10 per cent resulting in imprisonment, with an average of 
4,5 months and the rest as fines. 
If it is a fact that the number of inspection visits to detect and control undeclared 
work is increasing in many EU countries, this is not a universal trend in the EU. Variation 
can have diverse causes, most of the times influenced by policy options, available 
resources and institutional capacity. In Romania, for instance, there has been a steady 
increase between 2004 and 2012. The number of visits rose from 66,736 in 2004 to 98,498 
in 2012. In Spain, there was an increase of almost 10 per cent from 2010 to 2012 (476,844 
against 519,402 visits). In France, visits increased from 251,100 in 2008 to 356,200 in 
2011. On the contrary, in countries such as Ireland and Italy there has been a notable 
decrease. In Ireland, the reduction of the number of visits went down from 4,199 in 2011 to 
3,140 in 2012 while in Italy the number fell from 315,170 in 2008 to 243,847 in 2012.54 
Even if most of the inspectorates produce indicators on the number of visits, at least 
to incorporate in annual reports, data crossing is not yet explored, in many cases, to help to 
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 Figures provided by national studies. 
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 Annual report available at: 
http://www.rva.be/D_documentation/Jaarverslag/Jaarverslag_volledig/2011/RapportAnnuel2011/in
dex.html. Other annual reports are available at: 
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 Figures provided by national studies. 
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build scenarios habilitating decision makers to set roadmaps, on cause of the lack of 
specialists able to build and test models or poor information systems. Indeed, not all the 
countries disaggregate labour inspection statistics on undeclared work to the possible 
extent, while others like Belgium, make an extensive use of the data available based on 
sophisticated software and internal know-how to compile and read statistical outputs. 
Countries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are in a position to 
analyze and present variables by region, sector, gender and most frequent violations, but 
complain of not having sufficient internal know-how to extrapolate data. Other countries 
can only show the total figure on the number of visits and offenses encountered. Even 
when statistics are available, websites or annual reports do not always provide comparative 
data covering more than one year, making international comparison difficult. The multiple 
expressions of labour fraud and the lack of common definitions make benchmarking even 
more difficult. 
When it comes to labour inspection priorities, undeclared work is often associated 
with irregular migrant work and institutional responses of many countries put a strong 
emphasis on control of immigrants working illegally. In Spain, for instance, from 2010 to 
2012, 11 per cent of identified undeclared workers were foreigners without a valid work 
permit. This constitutes a demanding challenge for many labour inspectors, divided 
between their duty to report back any illicit fact they encounter as civil servants (for which 
they can be disciplinary or even criminally charged) and the role expected from them on 
protecting these workers' rights. Promotion of decent working conditions and requirements 
of national legislation on control of migratory flows needs to be equilibrated in a way to 
balance conflicting values.55  
Protection of migrant workers’ rights is challenging for labour inspectors in many 
ways. Even if the labour inspection policy recognizes its main role as being related to the 
implementation of decent work standards, in several countries like Ireland, redress of 
rights of migrant workers if they are undocumented is not possible for labour inspectors56 
or when possible, in-debt wages or compensation are in fact irrecoverable by workers after 
they are expelled from the country.  
Undeclared work deserves a concentration of efforts from national authorities not 
only on cause of the individual harm produced in the individual sphere of the worker, but 
also by the accentuated risks for the State's financial capacity. Despite of this, it should be 
clear that the mandate of labour inspection is much wider and the attention given to this 
field of action should not distract labour inspectors from other areas of work. In Greece, 
for instance, occupational safety and health inspectors are participating in visits for control 
of undeclared work,57 taking considerable part of their time. In Romania, all labour 
inspectors are engaged in control of undeclared work as a priority. This should not, in any 
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 At this purpose, the CEACR stated on 2008 in respect of application of Convention No. 81 in 
France, on the same sense as already had expressed on occasion of the 2006 General Survey on 
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case, lower the level of supervision on compliance with safety and health at work 
legislation  
Undeclared work is linked with major violations of human rights in cases of forced 
labour58 and human trafficking. According to ILO's figures, some 880,000 people are in 
forced labour in the EU, representing statistically almost 1,8 persons per 1,000 inhabitants, 
30 per cent of which are also estimated to be victims of sexual exploitation. Domestic 
work, agriculture and construction are the main sectors where victims were found.59 
Labour inspectors are privileged actors to spot cases of forced labour as they have free 
access to all workplaces.  
There are some sectors where intervention of labour inspectorates is particularly 
difficult, such as domestic work and the maritime, either because they may fall outside the 
scope of action of labour inspection, either on cause of limits to the inspection visit or lack 
of resources. The prevailing rule to provide access of labour inspectors to private 
households makes it dependent on the consent of the householder or prior judicial 
authorization, turning the inspection visit into a problematic operation and demanding 
from inspectorates innovative approaches still scarce. As for the maritime sector, questions 
such as territoriality, access to ships, mobility of the workforce and a lack of experience of 
inspectors makes it extremely hard to reach the vulnerable workers on board. Additionally, 
many of the EU countries have not yet ratified the Maritime Labour Convention 2006.60 
1.3. Scope 
As already mentioned, undeclared work can be found in a wide range of workplaces, 
sectors, and involving workers with different profiles and backgrounds. Such heterogeneity 
makes undeclared work difficult to approach and demand for specific strategies. 
Even when they have a wide mandate, labour inspectorates do not generally cover all 
manifestations of the informal economy, such as economic voluntary exchanges or social 
non-profitable work, nor self-employment except on the few cases where they have 
competences related to social security on the latter. Yet they are increasingly focusing on 
the civil or commercial relationships to assess the validity of contracts, knowing that many 
of the apparent independent relations for provision of services may hide a genuine 
employment contract (bogus self-employment).61 
The diversity of undeclared work conditions tackled by labour inspectorates in 
Europe is quite expressive differing from simple constructions where one enterprise or 
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 Forced labour is defined by ILO’s Convention 1930 (No. 29) as all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace or any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily.  
59
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individual tries to avoid social costs by not declaring work revenues to dynamic and 
complex schemes containing a myriad of enterprises on intricate networks operating 
beyond national borders and making billionaire profits. 
Although a closed list of cases would be problematic, not only on cause of national 
circumstances but also on reasons of ever changing practices, the national studies and 
information gathered from governments makes it possible to exemplify the most common 
expressions of undeclared work in the EU, at this stage. The following non-exhaustive 
examples provide an image of the heterogeneity of the phenomenon.62 
- Entrepreneurs or enterprises using a workforce fully undeclared to the authorities, 
especially social security, insurance and tax administration, or self-employed 
invisible to the system. Small businesses, sweatshops, manufacturing industries 
operating from households, warehouses, garages or premises with other apparent 
purpose, labour brokers, subcontractors integrated in large contracting chains in 
construction, isolated agricultural undertakings, moonlighters are the most 
common. Reasons for not declaring the business are many, from the lack of 
conditions to apply for a required licence, or the exact purpose of operating outside 
any kind of control, not paying taxes and minimum wages and other worker's 
entitlements. 
- In some other situations, businesses are declared but work as letterbox enterprises, 
even with false corporate purpose, false address or with a fake office or shop with 
the exclusive purpose of keeping an appearance of normality. ‘Bogus companies’ 
operate mostly in the construction sector. These enterprises have no assets, are 
registered by straw men, often with false identity, that after registering employees 
with social security declare bankruptcy, never paying contributions. The starting 
capital and managers disappear. It was estimated that this practice in Austria, for 
instance, causes a damage superior to 1 billion Euros every year. 
- Enterprises declaring only part of their activities and workers. Countries report 
practices such as using undeclared workers during night shifts or weekends63 and 
registered workers during regular working hours; declared employees only in 
visible establishments or to which clients and suppliers have access. Often, people 
receiving unemployment or sick benefits are employed under these circumstances 
for lower wages than other workers. 
- Enterprises regularly established using undeclared workers from suppliers and 
subcontractors in their premises or production in substitution of their direct 
workforce, under direct orders and supervision, as a way of avoiding payment of 
taxes, costs of occupational safety and health requirements and obtaining 
contractual flexibility. Extensive subcontracting chains offer fertile conditions for 
this kind of fraud, where subcontracted companies specialized on leasing the 
workforce on the margins of regulated private employment agencies or temporary 
work companies are selected with the sole purpose of escaping application of the 
law or collective agreements. The practice, denominated “marchandage” in France 
is well disseminated on construction sites, manufacturing industries or services, 
                                                     
62
 Information provided by governments and national studies. 
63
 Commonly maintenance and cleaning workers or staff for pre-production or post production such 
as reception of raw materials or packaging in factories. 
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where the workers are directly subordinated to the final client but apparently 
responding to an intermediary, sometimes a disguised worker of the final user.64 
- Complex schemes involving groups of “network” enterprises, where the mother 
company manages the brand and contractual operations, transferring the risks on 
the employees to the subsidiaries or businesses under its influence, for instance, 
with the same shareholders. Workers, that are not declared or only partially 
declared rotate continuously from one enterprise to another (carrousel method) to 
make detection difficult. Restructuration or closing of business becomes easier as 
contractual obligations with workers do not need to be met. Whenever there is 
suspicion from the authorities, the “leasing” companies disappear and are replaced 
by others.  
- In relation to the previous cases, unregistered temporary work agencies placing 
workers, or registered agencies using fraudulent practices, which are difficult to 
detect and to act upon due to the volatility of the entrepreneurship, integration on 
complex contracting chains, and apparent financial profits for all parties involved. 
Gang masters with a fictitious appearance, a post box and no real existence are 
frequent. Workers are selected through adds published in local newspapers and 
contacts happen exclusively through mobile phones, internet or in coffee shops. 
These fraudulent schemes are often used by irregular migration gangs for 
recruitment of workers under deceit in European countries outside the EU, with the 
aim to introduce them into forced or sexual exploitation. Unqualified or young 
workers are promised a regular labour contract or paid internships or “au pair” 
occupation, ending up as irregular migrant workers, often exploited. 
- Ill-defined labour relations on the margin of the provisions set by labour law 
recently incorporated in the domestic legal systems and prone to social fraud, such 
as very short term contracts for seasonal activities or on-call contracts (e.g. 
hospitality, entertainment) where workers are never declared, or have simultaneous 
employers where only one of them partially declares the worker.  
- False occupational status, extremely common in some sectors,65 often resulting 
from decentralization of production, restructuring processes or “post-fordist” 
flexible management models, and consisting on: 
 
 
                                                     
64
 In most of the countries this “staff” leasing is illicit. In any case, it should respect the standards 
set by the Private Employment Agency Convention, 1997 (No. 181). 
65
 The practice is frequent in many countries. For instance, the Dutch Federation of Contractors 
stated, in 2012, that the total number of the self-employed in the building industry was estimated at 
73,000, representing around 70 per cent of all alleged self-employed people, arising serious doubts 
about their real status. In France, national authorities estimate that 80 per cent of all cases of 
undeclared work detected in 2011 were related to the disguise of the employment relationship and 
other false employment status. Most affected sectors were construction, hospitality, commerce, 
services, seasonal work in agriculture, and road transport. In Belgium, 40 per cent of the European 
migrants working in the kingdom are false independent (93,668 by the end of 2011, representing an 
increase of 11,5 per cent when compared to 2009). Most expressive nationalities are the Dutch, 
French, Italian, Romanian and Polish (National study). 
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 Bogus self-employment, also known as false independent work or disguised 
employment relationships.66 Frequently, false independent workers are 
registered and pay contributions as such, but the employer is exempted from 
labour and social security obligations as it is common for commercial 
contractual relationships. The cost of contributions to social security is 
exclusively supported by the worker or sometimes (for qualified professionals 
mainly) paid to the worker as part of remuneration. Public revenues decrease 
as a result of this, not only because employers do not pay the due 
contributions as in many countries, the scale applicable to independent 
workers is lower than for waged work. Enterprises often outsource non-core 
activities to false self-employed, in some cases former employees, who 
remain under direct orders and control.67 In some cases, false independent 
workers accumulate with a regular declared job, from where they get social 
protection.  
The outsourced truck-drivers68 
These cases were reported by Portugal and Spain, consisting of transporting companies outsourcing 
their core business to self-employed drivers, former employees. 
Simultaneously with the termination of the labour contract, the drivers sign an exclusivity commercial 
contract to render transportation services to their former employer. 
Under the commercial contract the truck is sold or leased to the driver, who pays the equipment in 
instalments, often directly deducted from the price paid by user for the rendered services. 
The alleged self-account drivers receive daily instruction on deliveries, times for accomplishment, 
and are controlled on their timeliness. In some cases, a fixed fee amount is paid on a periodic basis. 
The contractor can, through this scheme, elude application of labour law and responsibility for road 
safety regulations, fixing maximum working periods and speed limits. 
When there is enough evidence of subordination the worker is entitled to reintegration in the 
company. 
                                                     
66
 The legal studies and jurisprudence built around the determination of the employment relationship 
have helped labour inspectorates to shape guidelines on how to approach false independent work. 
This is usually operated by establishing criteria to recognize subordination or, in some cases, 
economic dependence of the worker towards the work receiver, according to the general rule of the 
primacy of the facts. Indicators provided by the law, judicial rulings or doctrine are the privileged 
tools used by labour inspectorates to build the criteria to recognize labour contracts disguised under 
the form of civil or commercial law arrangements. The “defocusing” of the employment 
relationship makes it extremely difficult, though, to assess “grey” situations where the frontier 
between labour and commercial law is not evident. The ILO’s Employment relationship 
Recommendation 2006 (No. 198) provides examples of different methods used by countries, 
including the parameters for the recognition of the facts upon which to decide on the existence of a 
labour contract, and explicitly mentions that the determination of the employment relationship 
should be guided by the facts relating to the performance of work notwithstanding how it is 
characterized in contracts. 
67
 Workers are dismissed as a result of reengineering processes or invited to denounce the 
employment contract or to sign termination by mutual agreement, being afterwards hired as self-
employed, remaining under direction of the enterprise. 
68
 A well-known practice of outsourcing/insourcing described by Bronstein A. (2009: 61) who 
explains that where the work to be performed has not changed (…) the legal framework between the 
enterprise and the truck-driver has indeed changed significantly, for the truck-driver has become an 
independent contractor. 
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 False internships, where young workers are hired under apparent qualification 
purposes, but rendering exactly the same tasks as regular workers, often non 
remunerated or receiving symbolic earnings for transportation and meals. 
Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain reported this on sectors like banking, 
insurance, and mass media. Cases exist where the difference between the 
labour contract and the internship is feeble, demanding strong analytic efforts 
from inspectorates to distinguish the reality of the facts. 
- Abusive use of volunteering, often for NGO and other non-profitable private 
institutions such as corporations (ex: firemen), associations and foundations, where 
workers abusively characterized as volunteers receive undeclared sums as 
compensation for their efforts conducted under the same characteristics as in the 
employment relationship. In some cases, “compensation” applies only to over 
time, to which waged workers are compelled. 
- Use of new technologies to hide the employment relationship. Undeclared ICT 
home workers developing software, call centres installed in private households or 
parking lots, where workers respond to supervisors, receive direct orders and 
instruction, have defined working hours but are not considered as employees or are 
completely undeclared, being paid by piece or on a commission base. 
- Posting of workers in violation of the provisions set by the EC Regulation 96/71,69 
either on cause of a false employment status of posted workers, fictitious posting 
corresponding to an illicit placing of workers,70 or exceeding the allowed 
maximum periods for posting (two years); or partially declaring the remuneration; 
or underpaying according to national minimum wages or wages set by collective 
agreements, in many cases declaring the wage as paid in the country of origin. 
Most affected countries are older EU member States towards movement of 
workers from newer Member States. Practices as ghost enterprises recruiting 
workers in lower wage EU countries for direct work outside a provision of services 
or recruiting migrant third country workers already residing in the posted country 
were reported.71  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
69
 According to Art. 2 of the Directive a posted worker “means a worker who, for a limited period, 
carries out his work in the territory of a Member State other than the State on which he normally 
works.” The definition of worker is given by the law of the State to whose territory the worker is 
posted. A legal posting presupposes a previously established employment relationship and the 
legitimate operation of the employer in another Member State, namely being declared. Furthermore 
the basis for the posting is a commercial relationship between two economic entities in the sending 
and receiving country and the occupation of the worker in the sense of that exact commercial 
relationship.  
70
 Belgium authorities reported on a network placing Brazilian workers using Portuguese false ID. 
71
 Source: national studies. 
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Fraudulent networks for posting of third country nationals72 
Another case paradigmatic of the need of national labour inspectorates to internationally cooperate was presented again 
by Belgium. It consisted of a criminal network introducing migrant Brazilian workers with irregular residence as pretence 
Portuguese in construction sites.73 The workers entered in Portugal as tourist and were taken to small villages where on 
the basis of a rental contract they would get a national fiscal number. On possession of the individual tax card, a 
permanent residence permit was forged with the exact elements contained in the Brazilian passport and the fiscal 
identification number. 
On possession of the false permit, the gang master was in a position to post them to other EU countries as Portuguese 
workers. 
The fraud was difficult to detect on basis of the forged documents and because the workers speak Portuguese, creating 
an appearance of normality for third parties. It was only after investigation of the Belgium labour inspectorate in contact 
with the focal point for posting of workers in Portugal that the national authorities were able to cope with the case, as 
some small errors existed, for instance, on the forged permit such as the reference to fictitious immigration officers as 
having issued the document.74 
- Cross border organized trafficking, introducing migrant workers in irregular status, 
in many cases victims of forced labour to work in agricultural undertakings, 
construction, homework or the sex industry. In the Czech “client” system, for 
instance, migrant workers are placed through intermediary agents who make 
arrangements for work and work permits, accommodation and social protection, 
receiving part of the earnings of the workers in exchange, often keeping the 
workers misinformed and exploited.75 
- Misuse of extraterritorial cost arrangements, were part of the wage of a foreign 
employee can be used for tax-free allowances for costs of housing, transport or 
other costs resulting from working abroad. 
- Under-declaration of wages, one of the most reported practices, in all the 
countries, most commonly not declaring overtime work,76 declaring only the 
minimum wage and paying the rest under the counter or not declaring the value of 
payments in housing and food benefits, false part-time were only a percentage of 
the real worked hours is declared, disguise of remuneration under apparent fringe 
benefits (use of car, fuel tickets, credit card, shopping vouchers), false per diem, 
etc. These payments are found in all sectors, in enterprises of all sizes and with all 
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 Adapted from a case reported by national study. 
73
 The same practice was reported by Portugal and Spain. 
74
 In Spain, Brazilian workers were being introduced in construction sites also as Portuguese, with 
fake identification. As the colloquial differences were not evident for Spanish labour inspectors, 
some joint visits were organized with Portuguese labour inspectorate in border regions or to sites 
with a high prevalence of workers declared as Portuguese. While the authority competences would 
be used only by Spanish inspectors, their colleagues would act as experts, helping to conduct 
interviews with the workers and to analyze documents. 
75
 The extension of the phenomenon led to the intervention of State bodies and Caritas providing 
assistance to Ukrainian immigrants. A network of advice centers was set up in Ukraine and the 
Czech Republic providing information on employment opportunities, requirements for legal entry 
and residency, risks associated with illegal employment and residence, and facilitating the contact 
between job seekers and employers. 
76
 Belgium reported extensive abuse of undeclared and underpaid overtime in the South region of 
Occidental Flandre, for instance. As workers complained only after the contractual relationship 
ended, the evidence is very difficult to collect. 
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groups of workers (qualified, unqualified; male, female; national, migrant). 
Acceptance from part of the workers is an obstacle labour inspectors have to 
overcome, as they do not get cooperation. Accurate document checking and 
special interviewing techniques among other soft skills are used to identify the 
reality of the facts. When it comes to fringe benefits such as the use of the car for 
personal purposes (managers, sellers, etc.) it can be particularly complicated to 
determine what is to be declared as remuneration. 
Many other practices exist, such as the one reported in Spain, where to avoid payment 
of social contributions, some enterprises simulate termination of contract and new hiring of 
the same worker days after, faking the existence of a contractual rupture that never 
happened, or updating of salary scales as a result of collective bargaining mechanisms 
without the correspondent declaration to social security. 
In what concerns workers, these can be involved in fraudulent practices such as: 
- Individuals who are completely unknown to the administrative authorities as they 
do not declare any formal work and do not pay any tax on employment or self-
employment income (ghosts); 
- Individuals who are registered as regular workers with a second professional 
activity not declared (moonlighters); 
- Individuals who have a false occupational status, voluntarily or not; 
- Individuals with a regular labour contract where part of the wage is not declared; 
- Individuals registered, receiving social benefits, and working at the same time on 
their own account or for a third party without declaring the work situation and the 
revenues. 
A market niche appeared where businesses have specialized in selling forged 
documents so that citizens can get social benefits on cause of sickness, accident, etc. When 
social security is under the scope of labour inspectorates, these are also addressing these 
cases, like the illicit use of increased unemployment benefits on cause of a false dimension 
of the family aggregate, simulation of requirements to receive any kind of social 
allowances and others. In Spain, fraudulent or fictitious labour contracts are declared to 
obtain social benefits, where the enterprise creates apparent employment relationships, 
declaring the worker to social security, paying contributions for a short period and 
reporting afterwards false leaves entitling the worker to the benefits, who in turn will pay a 
The fraud of the 24/7 reception 
A practice in the private security sector consists on using “ghost” workers for premises requiring permanent surveillance 
(24 hours/7 days). As maximum working hours are limited by legal ceilings, a minimum number of guards is required to 
keep uninterrupted security. 
To reduce social costs, private security enterprises agree with workers to extend the working period paying overtime 
under the counter instead of hiring the required number of workers. As a smaller staff will be needed and overtime is not 
declared, the employer saves on direct and indirect labour costs. The worker, in return, receives a bigger sum every 
month. 
One of the shifts is attributed to a fictitious worker or to a worker placed in a different client, so that a list with the names 
containing the minimum number of workers can be disclosed to labour inspectors in case of a visit. Workers constantly 
rotate from one workplace to the other to elude authorities. 
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price to the alleged employer.77 In Belgium, another practice was reported where 
enterprises declare their workers and immediately after report false voluntary absence days 
non contributable.  
2. Governments responses to undeclared 
work  
Undeclared work has been signalized as a political priority of the European Union for 
more than two decades, with a growing impact since the publication of Communication 
COM(98) 219. Several other official texts have been issued on the subject, revealing its 
importance in the EU,78 namely the Council Resolution 2003/C260/01 which 
recommended to Member States articulated preventive and deterrent measures to reduce 
undeclared work, to which national governments responded through a vast array of 
strategies aiming at improving detection, preventing and strengthening sanctions.79 
Aiming at preventing undeclared work, governments have used measures to enable 
people to work legitimately, to bring people already participating in the undeclared 
economy to declare their activities and making use of initiatives to increase the payment of 
taxes. At the same time, detection measures have been improved fostering the perceived 
offences to be spotted and deterring potential offenders of committing illicit facts. 
Exhaustive use of mass media driven by moralization purposes or alerting potential 
offenders on the risks of being detected and its consequences are a common practice in the 
EU.  
Among the different approaches, penalization is the predominant (see chapter 5). In 
fact, according to Eurofound (2013), while the preventative,80 curative81 and 
commitment82 approaches were rising in all countries of the European Economic Area and 
Switzerland the deterrence approach was still the preferred in 2010, with 93 per cent of 
countries relying on the use of sanctions.83 On what refers to measures to improve 
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 In 2012, the Spanish authorities identified more than 23,000 enterprises creating fictitious jobs. 
78
 Resolution A5-0220/2000 of the European Parliament of 21 September 2000, published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union C 146/102, of 17 May 2001, Council Resolution 
2003/0260/01, Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Regions Committee COM (2007) 628, of 24 October 2007, and the 
Council resolution on transforming undeclared work into regular Employment (2003/C 260/01). 
79
 Eurofound 2013, p. 9. 
80
 Most of the countries were simplifying compliance procedures (87 per cent), making transition 
from unemployment to self-employment easier (65 per cent), giving direct tax incentives (61 per 
cent), among others. 
81
 Measures to stimulate purchasers to buy declared goods (e.g. service vouchers) or to stimulate 
suppliers to formalize operations, through amnesties, Vat reductions, gradual formalization 
schemes, etc. 
82
 Most the initiatives consisted of awareness raising campaigns to inform workers and employers of 
risks and costs of undeclared work (61 per cent), to inform users (61 per cent) or workers (57 per 
cent) of the benefits of declared work. Measures to improve knowledge of labour, social and fiscal 
laws were being used by 65 per cent of the countries. 
83
 87 per cent of which are administrative nature, against 74 per cent of criminal nature. 
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detection, 83 per cent of countries were sharing data and 74 per cent were using 
registration of workers prior to starting of work or on the first day of work. Certification of 
businesses, (65 per cent), mandatory workers identification in the workplace (65 per cent) 
and coordination of operation between different agencies were also being used (61 per 
cent). An interesting note provided in the same publication, is that only 45 per cent of the 
stakeholders from countries where preventative measures were implemented saw them as 
effective when compared to deterrence, demonstrating a strong prevalence of attitudes 
supporting the use of repression to tackle undeclared work, rather than enabling measures 
promoting formalization. 
Undeclared work is generally seen as a phenomenon with strong negative results 
receiving high political attention in most of the countries, as the following examples 
reveal. In Belgium policy options on the subject are defined by the council of ministers and 
in 2008 a Deputy Minister for the fight against fraud was created under the Prime 
Minister’s direct responsibility. In Spain, a national integrated strategy to prevent and 
correct fiscal, labour and social fraud was adopted in 201084 and later on in April 2012.85 
In Italy there is an ad hoc inter-ministerial coordination mechanism to fight undeclared 
work. Such initiatives paid off, as the countries assessed positive outcomes for the 
recuperation of millions of Euros. In France, the Prime Minister defined in November 2012 
a new plan to combat undeclared work for the period 2013/2015, focusing on repression of 
all abusive forms of cross-border posting of workers, control of subcontracting, 
sanctioning of false professional statutes and illegal employment of unauthorized foreign 
workers. The envisaged programme adopts a massive coverage by the government and 
social partners, improves controls through the professionalization of services and 
coordination by the anti-fraud departmental operational committees (CODAF).86 In 
Norway, a Joint Alliance against the Black Economy was also established in 2008. 
In most times governments see undeclared work within the more comprehensive 
domain of welfare and tax fraud, appointing as leading agencies either the labour 
inspectorates or the social and tax inspection services. The approach of each country to the 
problem depends to a large extent on national legal and public administration systems and 
political options and is basically focused either on deterrence or on enabling compliance. 
The financial crisis, however, is leading some European countries to prioritize the recovery 
of revenues and budget control, attributing bigger importance to tax investigation than to 
protection of workers’ rights. In Ireland, for instance, the revenues and the department of 
social protection are the leading agencies. In others, such as France, all institutions dealing 
with “illegal” labour have an equilibrated weight, and some like Spain, attribute a bigger 
role to labour inspectorates. Regardless of the precise weight of labour inspectorates in 
each system, labour inspection is considered fundamental and it heavily contributes to the 
sustainability of European social models. In Italy, as an example, the action of public 
agencies dealing with labour inspection (Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, INPS and 
INAIL) resulted in recuperation of 1,631,703,292 EUR for social security in 2012.87 
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 www.empleo.gob.es/itss/web/Atencion_al.../Plan_int_fraude.pdf. 
85
 Knowledge Bank of Good Practices of Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/search.php. 
86
 http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers_joints/plan_national_de_lutte_contre_le-
_travail_illegal.pdf. 
87
 National studies. 
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3. Tackling undeclared work through the 
labour inspection system 
3.1. The role of labour inspectorates 
Several institutions address the diversity of issues related to undeclared work, mostly 
labour inspectorates, social security, tax and immigration authorities. Although labour 
inspectorates are among the leading agencies, some countries tend to focus more on 
compliance with tax laws rather than on protection of workers’ rights. In Austria and 
Germany, for instance, the function to supervise undeclared work was transferred to the 
Federal Ministry of Finance in 2002 and 1991, respectively.  
Even when they have a wide mandate, like it happens in Spain, where part of the 
surveillance of compliance with social security law is under the labour inspectorate, not all 
manifestations of the informal economy are relevant for labour inspection, namely when 
they are not remunerated, or they fall under the mandate of other institutions, such as it 
happens most often with self-employment.  
The mandates of EU labour inspectorates are quite diverse, although they share 
common basis under ILO Convention No. 81. Characteristics such as the existence of one 
single institution or specialized inspectorates, coverage of both labour relations and 
occupational safety and health (e.g. Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania and Spain) or a mandate traditionally oriented to safety 
and health legislation (e.g. Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Norway, UK) influence the 
importance given to labour inspection in each country when thinking of labour law 
violations. Other features like the administrative division of the territory, applicable 
models of roman or common law, and of administrative of criminal sanctions, existence of 
alternative compliance mechanisms, and others are considerable variables helping to 
understand the different roles of labour inspectorates within the EU. 
Despite the differences, in some countries where the traditional mandate of labour 
inspection had a particular focus on occupational safety and health new agencies were 
created to deal with employment issues. This was the case of Ireland, where a National 
Employment Rights Authority (NERA) was established in 2007 to secure compliance with 
employment rights legislation, as a result of a framework Social Partnership Agreement 
signed between the government and social partners.88 For the first time labour inspectors 
were involved in the enforcement of provisions of employment acts.89 Restructuring 
processes have also taken place in the Netherlands, where a new inspectorate SZW was 
created to supervise compliance with regulations in the area of working conditions, 
prevention of major hazards involving dangerous substances, illegal employment and 
minimum wages, implementation of social security acts and detection of fraud, 
exploitation and organized crime within the chain of work and income (labour exploitation, 
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 Some other non EU European countries such as Switzerland, have created new authorities. On 1 
January 2008, a Federal law came into force on undeclared work that provides the appointment of 
an inspection body at the cantonal level with reinforced investigative powers. Above all, this has led 
to a regrouping of the labour inspection services and the agency in charge of monitoring migrant 
workers. 
89
 Formalized by the Employment Law Compliance Bill of 2008. At the time of writing, it is 
planned under a new legal act, that labour inspectors will be re-named Compliance Officers and will 
continue to deal with underpayment of national minimum wage, rates of pay, illegal methods of 
payment, unlawful deductions, failure to keep mandatory documents and registries, and work 
without valid employment permits. 
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human trafficking and large scale fraud in the area of social security), this latter under the 
direction of the Public Prosecution Service.  
In Switzerland, on 1 January 2008, a Federal law came into force on undeclared work 
that provides the appointment of an inspection body at the cantonal level with reinforced 
investigative powers. Above all, this has led to a regrouping of the labour inspection 
services and the agency in charge of monitoring migrant workers. At present, for example, 
Geneva inspectors carry out joint inspections of working conditions in sectors with the 
highest incidence of undeclared work (janitorial services, hotels and catering, etc.) in 
which all the inspection authorities take part. Recently tougher penalties (fines, 
disqualification from public contracts and the publication of offending firms on the 
Internet) have been agreed and endorsed by law. 
Other restructuring of public agencies happened in Belgium, where the Federal Board 
for the Fight against Illegal Work and Social Fraud and the Federal Coordination 
Committee were merged into the Social Information and Investigation Service aiming at 
figting large-scale benefit fraud. An increased mandate of labour inspection has taken 
place also in Romania and Poland, where respectively since 1999 and 2007, legality of 
employment of foreign workers is under supervision of the labour inspectorate.90 
Inter-ministerial agencies, national steering groups and tripartite committees were 
also created. In 1998, Italy formed a National Committee for the Formalization of Non-
Registered Labour with the aim to gaining knowledge on the informal economy. The 
committee proposes formalization policies and other initiatives.91 More recently, the 
country strengthened the powers of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy emphasizing 
the role played by labour inspectors, and enhanced coordination by setting a General 
Directorate for Inspection Activities.92 In Luxembourg, an Inter-administrative unit to fight 
illegal work (CIALIT) has been in operation since 2000. In the same year, Finland created 
a Direction group to fight economic crimes. 
Some other countries have formed specialized units or teams. This is the case of 
Spain, which in 2007 organized special teams for the informal economy, provided with 
guidelines for road transport and subcontracting chains. For the purpose of investigating 
social fraud related to posting of workers, the Federal Service of Social Security in 
Belgium created a cell of inspectors GOTOT. Moreover specialized teams for all cross 
border issues and for road transport93 and a network of inspectors (COVRON) specialized 
in cross border activities and the control of foreign employers posting workers to Belgium 
were formed. Abuses in the use of the “titres-service” steered the National Office of Social 
Security to create a special team for analysis and detection of these practices. Other groups 
specialize in port work, maritime, and trafficking of human beings. In Portugal, an internal 
task force for undeclared work was formed in 2010 and later on, a work group to define the 
parameters of a campaign addressing the subject. The Polish labour inspectorate created 
the Department on legality of work in 2007, and a specialized unit in each district 
inspectorate. In Lithuania, a coordinating group was also formed to analyse trends of 
undeclared work, set priorities and approve particular approaches. In the UK the JoSets, 
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 National studies and Brussels workshop. 
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 Knowledge Bank of Good Practices of Eurofound, available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/search.php. 
92
 Legislative Decree No. 124 of 23 April 2004 on the rationalization of the functions of social 
security and labour inspection. 
93
 National study. 
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organized since 2001 articulated the forces of the Ministry of Work and Pensions (DWP), 
Revenues (HMRC) and the Employment Agency Job Plus to act in the sectors of 
construction, taxis and couriers, catering and hospitality. 
Notwithstanding the differences between labour inspection systems in Europe, a 
common principle is the promotion of compliance with laws protecting the rights of the 
workers and this is the distinguishing feature of labour inspectorates towards other 
authorities. Labour inspectors often reinstate workers on their rights to wage and 
compensation. In Portugal, for instance, for the offender to pay the minimum fine, any 
outstanding rights of the workers will have to be readdressed. The acts of infraction refer 
all in-debt values towards workers, and can be immediately executed in courts by the 
public prosecutor, to which the labour inspectorate refers the cases, with a certification of 
the in-debt wages.94 
Labour inspectorates face many difficulties and challenges to obtain results in the 
fight against undeclared work. Both employers and workers are often uncooperative, the 
latter because of fear of losing the job, or because of the immediate gains with envelope 
wages by not paying taxes or even on reason of a legal limitation to undertake the 
occupation such as the lack of certification, minimum age for employment, or illegal status 
in the country. Some workers choose to be undeclared when they are receiving 
unemployment or sick leave benefits, especially if they can work from home or work 
independently. Employers, by their hand, want to reduce operation costs and avoid the 
limitation imposed by labour law to their managerial flexibility. This resistance and the 
constant mutation of fraud practices oblige labour inspectorates to constantly update their 
capacities, where a strict analysis of the surrounding environment occupies a strong place. 
This explains the importance of collaboration with traditional stakeholders, such as social 
partners, as well as the overture to work with less usual stakeholders, like observatories, 
research institutes and universities, and NGOs. 
3.2. Labour inspection planning experiences for 
undeclared work  
Undeclared work has become a priority for many labour inspectorates and this is 
reflected in their annual planning (Belgium, France, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, 
Romania). Planning on undeclared work as a regular activity to develop proactive action 
has become common for labour inspectorates in EU countries. When considering 
undeclared work, priorities of many labour inspectorates focus on high risk sectors and 
seasonal work.95 These sectors include construction, agriculture, cleaning, retail, 
hospitality, tourism. In addition, employment and temporary agencies and all forms of 
recruitment with the use of intermediaries are also given a priority. Risk mapping is 
increasingly a major action for inspectorates, notably because of mandatory requirements 
of the EU Directive 2009/52/EC on sanctions against employers of illegally staying third 
country nationals. 
Definition of priorities according to risks of non-compliance is based on accurate 
intelligence, in some cases. In Belgium, the Social Inspection Services Anti-Fraud 
Organization (OASIS) produces warning indicators useful to select individual targets, like 
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 Information from government. 
95
 This, in many cases, brings upon ethical dilemmas for labour inspectors between the duty to 
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the increase of turnover while there is a decrease in the number of employees, reduction of 
registered staff above a certain threshold, large differences in total wage sums and numbers 
of employees compared to previous employment declarations.96 In Portugal, priorities are 
set based on the indicators produced by the information system, cross checked with 
information provided by social security and social partners as a result of this, the action 
plan for 2008-2010 recognized as requiring major attention cases of totally or partially 
undeclared work; irregular use of fixed-term employment contracts; temporary work, 
placing and posting of workers in sectors reaching from the construction industry to 
seasonal works in agriculture and tourism. The multiannual plan established that 60 per 
cent of the 12,000 establishments to be inspected in the area of labour relations should be 
selected on basis of the risk of social fraud. One national coordinated campaign was 
developed every 3 months using all or a majority of labour inspectors. A central 
department prepared the intervention, developed guidelines, monitored execution and 
ensured coherence of approaches, and, for more complex or demanding action, intervened 
with the teams of inspectors in the field.  
The accuracy of the chosen strategies depends on the access to reliable, complete and 
updated sources of information on enterprises, sectors, workers, previous inspection visits, 
imposed sanctions and interventions from other authorities. Political options, academic 
studies, official statistics and complaints received from interested parties are also 
considered as indicators on which to base future action.97  
The expression of the phenomena in some countries led labour inspectorates to 
review their policies and integrate control of undeclared work in all of their visits. In 
Romania, regardless of the primary objective of the visit, detection of undeclared work is 
prevalent. OSH inspectors are deemed to immediately report to their colleagues any 
suspicion related to any form of irregular employment they may have noticed. This 
approach can produce results, but in any case, supervision of occupational safety and 
health standards should not be forgotten, as it is one of the main duties of labour 
inspection.98 It should also be considered that statistics at the national and regional level in 
Europe99 show that the economic crisis can considerably affect safety and health at all 
levels. 
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Although many inspectorates have a thorough experience of planning their activities 
based on risk analysis, this exercise is used more to classify levels of compliance with 
occupational safety and health standards than with labour relations. In fact, there are not 
many specific methodologies to map risks when thinking of undeclared work. Harmonized 
indicators at European level on what should drive the attention of labour inspection on this 
field are also still to be agreed upon.  
Labour inspection action is particularly difficult when it comes to sectors where the 
employment relationship is either difficult to spot (domestic work) or demanding serious 
efforts to characterize the employment contract against civil contracts (professions where 
subordination is less evident and calls for accurate use of investigation techniques: doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, artists, journalists…).100 On the latter case, lists of indicators 
provided by the law or central authority criteria helping to characterize the true nature of 
the facts work are the main tools used by inspectors.101 
3.3. Labour inspection strategies and methods for 
undeclared work 
According to Art. 3 of Convention No. 81, labour inspection has a twofold nature. On 
the one hand, it supervises the enforcement of legal provisions102 (even prior to a formal 
and practical inspection103). On the other hand, it has a preventive function, providing 
information, and educative services. This multiple role makes the labour inspectorate a key 
institution to face the many challenges of undeclared work. As resources are limited, 
innovative approaches have to be found, especially by improving detection capacities, 
using complementary forces with other authorities and relying on the expertise and ground 
based knowledge of social partners. An analysis of the Eurofound has concluded that EU 
labour inspectorates still make a predominant use of deterrence when approaching 
undeclared work, though efforts on prevention and measures to transform undeclared work 
into formal employment are becoming common use.104 In this regard, it should be noted 
that the European Commission Employment Guideline No. 9 had some influence on 
national options, by recommending a widespread approach including prevention 
measures.
105
  
Among the preventive action information campaigns, hotlines, and call centres 
providing information on legal obligations and workers’ rights are among the most usual 
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options of labour inspectorates. Enforcement is mostly based on the imposition of 
sanctions of administrative or criminal nature and increasingly on penalties relying on 
negative publicity given to enterprises using undeclared work, restriction to apply to public 
tenders and exclusion from financial benefits.  
Strategies are developed either on a sectoral basis covering all forms of undeclared 
work (e.g. construction, retail), or focusing on particular manifestations (e.g. bogus self-
employment), or on precise phenomena in sectors (e.g. false internships in mass media), or 
addressing precise economic groups (e.g. subcontracting for a given multinational 
company), or delimited regions and sectors (e.g. informal employment in small 
construction sites in a district).  
Sectoral approaches are the most common. Italy, for instance, defined a strategy for 
agriculture and construction aiming at four regions (Calabria, Campania, Puglia and 
Sicily). Teams were made up of 550 labour inspectors from INPS, INAIL and Carabinieri. 
10,000 agriculture firms and 10,000 building sites were selected for inspection from March 
to December 2010. As a result, more than 20,300 irregular workers were identified around 
which 9,150 were undeclared. Simultaneously with this, more than 10,000 violations of 
occupational safety and health standards were recorded in the inspected companies.106  
Integrated approaches are increasingly being used. For instance, inspectorates 
covering occupational safety and health have been including psychosocial risks in their 
action, considering forms of employment and informality at the workplace as being related 
with their mandate (e.g. Germany). It is also being considered that there is a probability 
that non-compliance with occupational safety and health requirements goes hand in hand 
with violation of labour law and vice-versa. This reflects the importance of cooperation 
between inspectorates or different areas in the same inspectorate, as a way to gain 
efficiency and improved outcomes. Awareness of the need to approach undeclared work 
through multidisciplinary lens is also leading the labour inspectorates to define job profiles 
of labour inspectors in a way to include capacities on finance, accountability and 
information technologies, in addition to the legal expertise (e.g. France, Portugal). 
Visibility is an important deterrent factor. Labour inspectorates are making use of 
mass media as a regular channel to disseminate information on legal obligations and as a 
marketing tool, were outcomes of inspection actions are revealed, such as the number and 
amount of sanctions imposed after an inspection campaign.107 Interventions in a sector are 
announced through newspapers, so that enterprises can self-regulate their working 
conditions according to legal parameters, before the visits (Belgium, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain). Media are used for blame and shame purposes, where following judicial 
condemnation the labour inspectorate publicly reveals bad practices of offending 
enterprises. 
The inspection visit is a crucial moment to gather evidence on undeclared work. 
Success depends to a large extent on accurate planning and use of institutional synergies. 
Databases, archives, information about the enterprise available on internet are sources used 
by labour inspectors to gain knowledge of the enterprise and the sector before intervention. 
There are some challenges for inspectors at this moment, like the need to pinpoint the 
location of hidden workplaces, locating the head of businesses, as well as during the visit 
the ability to identify all the workers in establishments, especially if these are disperse or 
do not have delimited physical borders, like construction sites and agricultural 
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undertakings (reports of workers hiding or escaping from work places are common) or 
determining liability in subcontracting chains.  
Additional problems consist of regularizing cases of non-compliance, sanctioning and 
compensating the workers whose rights have been violated without putting the workers’ 
jobs or enterprise survival at risk. False independent work can also be a serious trial for 
labour inspector’s effectiveness given the difficulty in gathering the indicators of existence 
of an employment relationship particularly if they are not unmistakeably defined by the 
law. Occupations less visible such as telework, homework or domestic work present 
particular problems, especially for identification of cases and access to workplaces.  
The most common visits used by labour inspectorates to spot undeclared work are 
unannounced, usually blitz controls, where labour inspectors go to the premises, ask for 
personal identification and interview workers, cross results of interviews with enterprises’ 
registries, social security inscriptions and other documents.108 Often, police forces help to 
identify workers or to secure the premises avoiding workers from leaving the worksite 
while the inspection is being carried out. This type of “muscled” approach generally pends 
towards the imposition of sanctions and recovery of social contributions and it is used for 
high risk sectors or where other approaches were already tried without success, or where 
the use of informal employment on large scale was signalized. Comprehensive visits in 
joint intervention teams, in cooperation with other authorities and backstopped by the 
police are also organized on these cases. 
The nature of many sectors (agriculture, commerce, hospitality, entertainment, 
tourism, private security, etc) demands for inspection visits outside of regular working 
hours, at night or resting days. The Spanish ITSS, for instance, increased night visits by 63 
per cent and weekend visits by 234 per cent from 2007 - 2009. The outcome was an 
increase of identified undeclared workers from 34,784 in 2007 - 48,762 in 2009 and a 
growth of around 10 per cent in social security revenues.  
Besides identifying the workers, interviewing them and cross checking their 
declarations with the content of documents, observation of working conditions with 
analysis of individual operations and tasks is also used as a method to define their precise 
occupation, especially when there is a need to establish the existence of the employment 
relationship. Extensive interviews with employers and their representatives, sometimes 
lawyers and accountants, to obtain information on the nature of contracts (e.g. bogus self-
employment), signal underpayment of minimum wage, paid holidays and other benefits 
and identify the employer in extensive contracting chains. The interviews are often 
conducted at the labour inspectorate to avoid interference and create a neutral environment. 
Electronic files are accessed on the spot or downloaded for further analysis.  
At operational level, the surprise effect of the inspection visit is fundamental to 
identify undeclared workers. If inspectors cannot have a swift access to premises the 
success of intervention is put at risk. However, it is reported that access to premises 
requiring biometric certification can be a modern and discrete method of obstruction to the 
labour inspection visit or at least a challenge to overcome for many inspectors. In fact, 
many enterprises are using sophisticated access controls to their premises, via conformity 
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of fingerprints, iris, etc. on reasons of control of absenteeism or security. The freedom of 
entry of labour inspectors is limited by these legitimate management options, especially on 
occasion of blitz controls. The time consumed to gain access to the premises is reported as 
allowing less compliant employers to hide or send away undeclared workers using separate 
exits such as garages. Special efforts of labour inspectorates are required to gather any kind 
of evidence on these cases, particularly when planning the visit.  
Innovative approaches have led to successful cases. In Sweden, the ID06 project for 
construction has proven to be an effective control measure aimed at tackling undeclared 
work by requiring all workers at construction sites to register and carry proper identity 
cards. Similar measures have been introduced in Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal. 
In Italy, identity cards have been used on construction sites since 2006, although 
employers with fewer than ten employees are released from the obligation of issuing these 
cards by keeping a daily register. Also in Sweden, on January 2007, a law obliged staff 
registration for those working in restaurants and hair salons. The national tax agency 
estimated that about 4,200 workers were regularized as effect of this measure. Other 
innovative methods for identifying undeclared work include comparing the different bid 
prices for public tenders. When a bid is significantly lower than other competing offers, 
this is considered as an indicator of the risk that the employer does not pay social security 
benefits or other contributions, thereby allowing him to offer the services at below market 
value. This approach is used, for example, in Estonia and Portugal.109 
Estimating undeclared work in plantations110 
Spain uses a technique to disclose seasonal undeclared work during harvest seasons on orange plantations 
and vineyards. 
Labour inspectors collect information on the size of the undertaking by consulting land registries, along with the 
production levels declared for effects of harvest. They then estimate the number of workers and working days 
needed to obtain such production levels. If the number of workers registered in the social security data base 
does not match with the calculation, employers are summoned to explain the reason for the mismatch. In case 
they do not reply or fail to convince, visits are rendered to the plantation to check and identify undeclared 
workers and severe penalties are issued in case they are found. 
As the farms are in isolated areas, visits are prepared using Google maps. 
The method produced good results, with an increase of 217 per cent of registration of workers with social 
security authorities in 2009 in the regions and sector. 
Access to electronic files with information on the workers, wages and working hours 
is also creating some problems for labour inspectors. A practice of given businesses exists 
where they use software that allows for immediate modification of files whenever and only 
if labour inspectors ask them to provide evidence. As inspectors are not always trained on 
how to detect these fraudulent techniques, how to have access or even analyze electronic 
data, investigation may be difficult and not precise. To deal with this, Belgium inspectors 
can seal computer equipment when this is required for investigation or gathering of 
evidence.111  
A sector where serious difficulties are reported is domestic work, on reason of the 
limitation of access of labour inspectors to the private household. In a large number of the 
EU countries, in line with the obligation of respect for privacy set by Art. 8 of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights,112 access to the private domicile depends on 
consent from the householder or judicial authorization. As inspection visits for control of 
undeclared work rely very much on the surprise factor, many inspectorates tend to see their 
intervention on the sector as leading to poor results and overall inefficiency. This, as well 
as the reduced number of complaints113 can help to explain the low coverage of the sector. 
In Ireland, NERA has developed a pilot experience where employers are summoned by 
mail to let the labour inspector gain access into the household when the visit takes place. In 
case it is refused, the employer has to provide an alternative place for the meeting. The 
method has produced good results, but it still does not help to map where undeclared 
domestic workers can be found.  
Violence against inspectors is a problem in many countries when visits are paid to 
high risk sectors and deal with clandestine businesses, but not only. Most serious cases 
happened in France, where two labour inspectors were killed on a farm in Dordogne, but 
particularly notice of verbal menaces are frequent. This is a reason why countries like 
Poland and Portugal always send inspectors in a team of two114 or equipped with mobile 
phones. Commonly, when harassment is expected inspectors are accompanied by the 
police.115 
Experiences from other inspection systems could be adapted to labour inspection, 
improving effectiveness. This is the case of an initiative organized in 2008 in Estonia, 
where the Tax and Customs Board notified 1,000 enterprises with wages below the 
sectorial level to justify the difference. As a result, 46 per cent of the notified companies 
adjusted the wages and increased declared amounts. This proved to be productive to 
control under-declaration of remuneration.116 
3.4. Tools and technical support for labour 
inspectors 
The first and better tool for labour inspectors to tackle effectively undeclared work is 
the law. The EU legislation provides some rules helpful for the control of legality of labour 
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relations such as the obligation set for the employer to inform the worker on the conditions 
applicable to the contract set by the Council Directive No. 91/533/EEC. 
Some legal provisions can, in fact, be quite helpful to address informal employment, 
false independent status, such as legal presumptions establishing the existence of an 
employment relationship117 as prescribed by ILO’s Recommendation 2006 (No. 198). In 
countries like Portugal there is a legal presumption of the existence of a labour contract 
when two or more indicators identified by the law are verifiable.118 In Spain, the levels of 
subcontracting were limited for the construction industry and the concepts of contractor, 
subcontractor and independent worker were defined, facilitating the supervision of 
compliance and law enforcement.119  
Technical tools developed for undeclared work include planning maps, criteria to 
select enterprises, manuals, operational guidelines, checklists and scripts for interviews, 
visit protocols and visit follow up procedures. As regards the latter, in Ireland, NERA 
inspectors carry out inspections using agreed case management procedures– including 
inspection checklists and questionnaires –which deal with the conduct of the visit and the 
follow up in cases of non-compliance. In Belgium, the SIRS (Service d’ Information et de 
Recherche Sociale)120 develops common tools for the different social inspectorates, such as 
manuals on enquiry powers of inspectors according to the Social Penal Code, instructions 
for monthly controls, instructions on the production and communication of statistics and a 
manual on the use of common forms, among others. Guides on legal interpretation (e.g. 
Guide on Transnational posting of workers, 2009), periodical information such as the 
CODAF newsletters, inform flash news about inspection operation, jurisprudence and 
press articles on undeclared work are prepared and, additionally, the regional permanent 
secretariat of CODAF is available to help inspectors on the legal and technical treatment of 
most difficult cases.121 Also in Belgium, a fraud observatory at the ONEM inspectorate 
analyzes new forms of fraud and develops control tools. The UNIZO test can help to 
determine the nature of a contractual relationship through the use of a formula which 
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mathematically defines whether a person is an employee or self-employed.122 Spain has 
produced, in 2006, an operation guide for the control of irregular economy and work of 
migrants, added by operational criteria developed in 2007123 and in France labour 
inspectors receive permanent legal and methodological support through inter-ministerial 
instructions.124 In Portugal, the Central Directorate for Support of Inspection Activities, 
under the national Authority for Working Conditions keeps a database of legislation, 
jurisprudence and collective agreements on the intranet, where all the methodological tools 
are also uploaded.125  
The National Employment Rights Authority codes of practice126 
NERA has developed a Code of Practice and a Guide to Inspections document for employers, both available 
on their website. A code of practice for determining employment or self-employment status of individuals, 
prepared under the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness and updated by the Hidden Economy Monitoring 
Group in 2007 intends to eliminate misconceptions on who is a self-employed or a dependant worker. The 
code defines criteria on whether an individual is an employee127 or a self-employed, alerts to the 
consequences arising from the determination of the individual’s status and provides the contacts of 
organizations to contact in case of doubt. 
Databases with information on businesses, workplaces, inspection visits and 
procedures are fundamental tools and exist in most of the inspectorates, though at different 
levels of sophistication and completeness.128 ICT can improve labour inspection 
performance not only in detecting undeclared work but also on preventing non-
compliance. In the Netherlands, for instance, a register containing identification of people 
fined for fraud warns the labour inspectorate and the tax authority whenever that person is 
registering a new temporary work agency. In Belgium, inspectors use encoded unified 
models with individual electronic signature to report offences to the competent body for 
imposition of fines. In Ireland, a web-based tool for registration of construction sites 
available since April 2012 accessible to the labour inspectorate provides a good basis to 
plan intervention in the sector.129 Software can be used to map risks of incompliance, 
select targets and help when investigating companies or legal persons, but not many labour 
inspectorates are still making full use of these tools to the extent tax authorities do. In 
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Ireland, for instance, the Revenue authority examines electronic systems of businesses, 
copies and downloads electronic data for further analysis with use of computer-assisted 
intelligence automated techniques. Digital information extracted is stored on encrypted 
storage devices guaranteeing confidentiality of data. 
Measurement of minimum costs of activity if all labour obligations are met can help 
labour inspectorates to identify fraud. In Italy, a tool was developed to measure labour 
costs in construction in 2010 following a social partners' agreement on defined reference 
minimum labour costs. Cassa Edile (social security institution) at provincial level certifies 
if a firm complies with these costs, on which case a reduction in social contributions can be 
offered. Companies offering lower costs should explain the reason for the difference. 
Failure to convince will imply a declaration of irregularity which will only be cleared if the 
firm pays the difference between the declared costs and the due level.130 In another case, 
the Portuguese Authority for Working Conditions has created with sectorial social partners 
a reference table for private security where costs related to collective agreements’ 
minimum wages, social contributions, work accidents insurance, medical surveillance and 
other indicators are considered. When enterprises or public services are selecting a security 
service provider they are recommended not to go below the minimum cost. By requesting 
to client companies or ministries the commercial contracts where the price of the service 
was set, labour inspectors are able to calculate if there is a profit margin for the private 
security provider. If not, the provider will be selected for further inspection and signalled 
as a high risk target to be kept under strict surveillance.  
New formal obligations for employers can sometimes be useful for control purposes. 
In Greece, a measure was introduced by Law No. 3996/2011, under the second 
memorandum of the Greek government with the Troika. Enterprises from sectors to be 
selected by ministerial decision have to use electronic labour cards to register all working 
time. Adherence to the measure is compensated by a reduction of indirect labour costs, 
while non-compliance is punished with strict sanctions. Labour cards depict automatically 
the times of arrival, departure and pauses of workers. Information is sent electronically to a 
common database accessible to SKEE, IKA and ETAM.131 In Belgium, a law from 27 
December 2012 introduced the obligation of daily registry of all persons in construction 
sites with at least two entrepreneurs working simultaneously or in succession or where the 
surface is at least of 1000 m2. 
The use of electronic devices can also facilitate the work of labour inspectors, such as 
it happens with the control of overtime of road transport workers under EC Regulation 
No. 561/2006,132 by accessing the digital tachographs with authorized cards, providing the 
immediate reading of distribution of time or allowing the download of accumulated data 
for analysis of working and rest periods with use of a software. 
3.5. Training programs for labour inspectors 
Undeclared work is included in the training programmes of many inspectorates both 
at occasion of initial or continuous training. For example, France and Portugal, during the 
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initial training, an average of two weeks is dedicated to inform new appointed inspectors 
on how to detect and use different techniques to investigate fraud, with particular attention 
to atypical forms of work in violation of labour law, such as bogus self-employment and 
informal employment. In the latter, half of the labour inspectors received extensive training 
on labour fraud.133  
In France, the trainers are experienced labour inspectors, magistrates and agents from 
other supervisory bodies. The INTEFP (Institut National du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la 
Formation Professionnelle) provides specialization inter-institutional trainings covering 
analysis of illegal work cases and improvement of evidence gathering and interviewing 
techniques. The programme includes modules of control methodologies, road transport, 
international provision of services, false subcontracting, agriculture and illicit exercise of 
regulated professions such as ambulance drivers and private security agencies. A new 
Inter-regional training center (CIF) inaugurated in Montpellier in 2011 in collaboration 
with the National School of Competition, Consumption and Fraud Repression (ENCRF) 
has inaugurated a common training for labour inspectors and economic inspectors. The 
national network of public service schools also organizes common trainings for civil 
servants under probation, helping to mindset future collaboration. In 2012, 700 officers 
were trained.134  
In the Netherlands and Spain,135 training is equally developed on how to detect fraud. 
Spain trains inspectors on how to cross data sources such as revenues declaration and 
accounting logs. In Belgium, every office has a permanent training group to organize 
regular training on new subjects, for instance recent legal acts. E-learning is also available, 
for instance on the “process-verbal”. The Czech Republic has recently (2012) transferred 
178 employment officers to the State Labour Inspection Office, following which training 
was provided.  
On cause of the economic crisis, though, some countries are not in condition to train 
the inspectors. In Romania, in the last four years no actual training addressing undeclared 
work was given to labour inspectors, weakening considerably their capacities. Past training 
incorporated a comprehensive set of information on types and causes of undeclared work, 
legislation and inspection procedures. 
Labour inspectors need to be capacitated on the use of soft skills to conduct visits on 
undeclared work as they will be dealing regularly with non-cooperative employers, poorly 
informed workers, migrant workers and can face obstruction to inspection. Joint visits with 
other authorities will require high levels of assertiveness for which training is also 
suggested.  
Recently, at the EU level, the project Euro Detachment136 coordinated by the French 
INTEFP and ASTREES, provided training to 30 labour inspectors and other officials from 
five countries137 on control of the effectiveness of the “acquis communautaire” on posting 
of workers, building capacities on supervision of the application of Directive 96/71. The 
training was designed under an approach of problem solving and included immersion visits 
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where participants could observe how their peers were dealing with real cases. An 
interactive site was created to foment cooperation between inspectors of the participating 
countries. Networks such as RIIFT (Réseau international d’Institutions de Formation dans 
le domaine du Travail138) also help to facilitate experience sharing of training schools or 
departments of labour inspectorates and other labour administration institution on their 
practices and tools, aiming at building an international community of practice on training 
strategies.  
When it comes to a possible European training, the countries involved in the studies 
revealed caution, as the legal frameworks are diverse and do not share common basis 
besides the specifics of the Directive posting of workers, on contrary of what happens on 
occupational safety and health, labour inspection systems themselves are diverse and 
institutions involved in the fight of undeclared work and social fraud are equally different 
from one country to the next. Training on subjects such as soft skills or experience sharing 
was welcomed, nevertheless, as well as possible workshops for decision makers on 
strategy setting. 
4. Preventive approaches to undeclared 
work 
4.1. Incentives for compliance 
Although, many measures which are provided by the legal system are not under direct 
use or control of labour inspectorates, they are helpful for their action, and are used with a 
view to reducing the phenomenon, such as: 
- Reduction of administrative burdens for enterprises. In Hungary, employers can 
use simplified labour contracts for seasonal work (agriculture and tourism) and 
declare workers by text message or electronically via a client gateway system.139 
Taxes are paid on a daily basis by entering a code into the text message or into the 
gateway. Between 1st August and 31st December 12.5 million work days were 
registered using this method.140 
- Facilitation of creation of new businesses. In Portugal, an enterprise can be created 
in a one-stop-shop in a couple of hours, receiving all the documents required for 
immediate operation.141 
- Simplification of compliance. In Spain, a common certificate of compliance with 
fiscal, social and labour obligations can be obtained through a single request.142 
Luxembourg simplified registration of domestic workers in 1999. The employer 
pays the net wage to the domestic worker, fills in a single declaration and sends it 
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to social security (CCSS), which directly calculates the gross salary and collects 
the contribution from the employer. Every six months, a declaration is sent to both 
parties of the employment relationship with information of what has been paid.143 
A simplified declaration system is equally provided by LIMOSA144 in Belgium. 
Employers register electronically new employees and the system automatically 
notifies all social security institutions.145 
- Incentives for purchasers or for workers. In Belgium and France, the government 
introduced the “titres-services” to encourage citizens to stop using undeclared 
domestic work (see box below).146 Denmark introduced in 1994 the home service 
scheme, administered by the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, which 
makes it possible to receive a subsidy for garden work, shopping for daily goods, 
cooking, cleaning, laundry, bringing children from and to school, walking animals 
and packing in connection with moving.147 In Finland, a tax credit for domestic 
workers was introduced in 2011, where it is more advantageous to the householder 
to ask for a receipt than to use undeclared services. In 2004, more than 155,000 
households availed of this credit. Since 2009 the scheme has started to cover 
installation and maintenance of ICT in the home.148 Similar schemes exist in 
Switzerland. 
The services voucher in Belgium149 
In Belgium, vouchers can be bought from registered enterprises (approved by the Service Voucher Recognition 
Commission at the National Employment Office) to pay for domestic work. Each voucher corresponds to one hour of 
work. The payment is partially deductible and in addition the registered company is entitled to a government subsidy. 
Workers have a service voucher employment contract for fixed term or open ended, full or part time, accumulating social 
security rights and are insured against occupational accidents. Users date and sign the voucher and hand it over to the 
worker, who passes the voucher to the enterprise, which in turn sends it to the issuing company in charge of refunding 
the value. Users can buy a maximum of 500 vouchers per year. From 1 January 2013, each voucher costs 8,50 Euros. 
The initiative has proved to be successful. In 2010, over 136 000 people worked in these companies. Users have grown 
from 120,247 in 2004 to 857,471 by June 2012.150 
- Introduction of preventive controls. In the Czech Republic, the DONEZ 
programme allowed the government to identify about 10 per cent of people to be 
likely expelled from the unemployment register because of being engaged in 
undeclared work, during the first five months of implementation. The programme 
obliged the unemployed to present themselves in person at the post office at 
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prescribed but unpredictable times.151 In Belgium, employers posting workers are 
obliged to disclose to Belgium clients the L1 certification, whom on their part have 
to report to social security all cases of posted workers for which certification was 
not exhibited. Failure to comply creates penal liability.  
- Active employment measures that can prevent people from engaging in undeclared 
occupation, such as the test trading scheme generated in the UK, where the 
unemployed can test a business idea for self-employment for a time period without 
losing the unemployment benefit, or in Belgium, where long term unemployed can 
work a determined number of hours per year in areas such as gardening or caring, 
placed by a local employment agency, paid by users with cheques bought in their 
commune of residence, and keeping unemployment benefits.152  
- Cooperative relations with biggest tax payers setting good examples of 
collaboration of public authorities with private initiative. In Spain, major problems 
of reference companies are discussed in a common forum with authorities. This 
helps the administration to better understand the perspective of companies and to 
have a wider view of the problems in each sector.153 
- Promotion of self-regularization initiatives. In Spain, in 2011, following the Royal 
Decree No. 5/2011, of 26 May 2011, employers were provided with the possibility 
to regularize undeclared work situations. They were invited to sign labour 
contracts lasting at least six months and to register workers in social security 
before 31 July 2011. If they did so, no sanction would be imposed nor backdate 
social contributions would be demanded. After this deadline, stringent sanctions 
would be applied.  
In Italy employers regularizing migrant irregular construction workers were offered 
fiscal incentives. In 2001, an automatic regularization procedure was installed where 
employers who declared their willingness to regularize taxes and undeclared workers were 
given a general amnesty from contributions and taxes not paid in previous years. A 
progressive regularization process was also installed, through individual plans submitted to 
the Committee for Formalization of Irregular Labour (CLES). This committee consists of 
members from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, the Ministry of Environment 
and Territory, INPS, INAIL, local health units, prefectures, municipalities and trade 
unions. However, the initiative was not as successful as expected.154 Similar initiatives 
happened in Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands.155 
Other initiatives for self-regulation exist, targeting different sectors. In Portugal, this 
is a method used at least since the late 1990’s with good results. The initiatives are planned 
and monitored with deep involvement of social partners. Employers’ organizations, for 
instance, had a strong participation and were decisive for regulation of the merchandising 
sector where bogus self-employment was widely used. 
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The trend for simplification coexists with more stringent obligations for employers, 
especially of pre-declaration, reliable registration and self-assessment. In Slovakia, for 
instance, since December 2009 employers of risk industries have been obliged to report 
new recruited workers to the labour inspectorate within 30 days from start of activity.156  
4.2. Preventive measures of labour inspection 
Labour inspectorates have introduced press campaigns, partnership agreements and 
other incentives to try to encourage registration of undeclared workers. This preventative 
approach intends to change community attitudes. For instance, the Polish labour 
inspectorate issues press material concerning prevention of illegal employment and 
provides training on the subject to social partners and other public authorities entrusted 
with the supervision of working conditions. This kind of regular information services is 
provided by many inspectorates.157 Release of information is also a strong feature of the 
Irish approach to fostering compliance. NERA has information officers providing guidance 
on labour law compliance by phone, additionally to the information available on the 
website and printed resources.158 In France,159 construction owners are elucidated about 
their obligations when applying for a licence. Countries such as Spain develop education 
programmes in schools.160 Belgium organizes road shows, and introduced FAQS on 
institutional websites.  
Campaigns are one of the main tools used by inspectorates to reduce undeclared 
work. The nature of these tools differs depending on the objectives and more or less 
repressive orientation of national authorities. Some campaigns reside on providing 
information to employers, workers or the civil society while others consist on the 
development of targeted operational visits to a given sector or to tackle a precise problem. 
Many campaigns are developed in two different stages, first providing information and 
then visiting workplaces to enforce the law. Spain, for instance, has engaged in preventive 
campaigns for seasonal work in agriculture and planned a major campaign for 2012 aiming 
for the complete control of production chains making use of the mechanism of social 
corporate responsibility. Similar initiatives are carried out in almost all of the EU countries 
usually targeting sectors where risks of non-compliance are higher or specific phenomena 
were spotted. Campaigns are not only addressing informal employment, but very much 
under-declared work. The preparation of communication and inspection campaigns for 
undeclared work is quite detailed in countries like Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, with a strong support from social partners and involvement of other institutions. In 
France, an initiative focusing on seasonal tourism work was based on the idea that satisfied 
workers will provide quality services. This was a main argument to deter employers from 
using illicit practices.161 
Control of access to given sectors or to the labour market is also used as a preventive 
tool against social dumping. In Norway, there is since 2011 a compulsory approval scheme 
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where companies rendering cleaning services have to seek for approval from the labour 
inspectorate, which can ban companies that were not approved. Spain created a register of 
accredited enterprises for construction, whose licence can be cancelled as a result of 
inspection.162 The same applies in most of the countries for private employment agencies, 
being either the labour inspectorate or other service of the system of labour administration 
to certify the companies.163  
The EU has set as minimum requirements to prevent the employment of illegally 
staying third-country nationals, that employers should check if the third-country national 
has a valid residence permit or another authorization for stay before recruitment and notify 
the authorities about the employment relationship.164 Measures were also undertaken in 
several countries to promote legalization of undeclared migrant workers. In Belgium, 
France, Italy, Spain165 and Portugal166 several programmes have been carried out, in many 
with direct involvement of labour inspection providing information to migrant workers and 
engaging in visits with the purpose of promoting the formalization of contracts. In Poland, 
there were three amnesties for immigrants with irregular status in 2003, 2007/2008 and 
2011. Finally, the Act on Legalisation of Stay of Some Foreigners in the Territory of the 
Republic of Poland, which came into force in 1 January 2012, allows for irregular migrants 
to seek for a residence permit provided that some conditions are met, such as a continued 
stay with no interruption since at least 20 December 2007. Foreigners awarded with the 
permit are allowed to work. By mid-August 2012, a total of 9,154 applications were 
submitted, of which 2,883 were approved.167 Some different initiatives have been taken. In 
Belgium, the abuse of false self-employment status by European migrants led the 
government to legislate in a way to demand payment of their respective social security 
taxes from the day they arrive in the country.168  
Prior declarations to the labour inspectorates can act as a deterrent. This is the case of 
the prior declaration of posting of workers, usually consisting of the name of the worker, 
dates and place of posting, and predictable duration, or working schedules and wages in 
the case of France, or the address of the person in possession of social documents in the 
territory of the country where the work is executed, in the case of Luxembourg, or even a 
clause according to which the posting employer engages himself to respect the rules of the 
receiving State. 
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4.3. Sanctions for undeclared work 
As mentioned in the Report of the 100th ILC, labour inspection cannot be fully 
understood without sanctions.169 Most countries use fines and administrative proceedings 
as sanctions in labour inspection. In general, a good number of countries have amended 
their laws so that sanctions may be deterrent, with higher amounts for fines and more 
expedite procedures (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and the UK).170 Criminal sanctions are usually reserved 
for the most serious cases of social fraud and violations of human rights like human 
trafficking for forced labour. This is the case of Greece, where labour inspectors can 
impose fines from 500 to 50,000 Euros and can submit reports to the public prosecutor for 
criminal liability as well.171 
In countries such as France, Germany and Norway, penalties for undeclared work can 
include detention. In others administrative fines are imposed. The relative seriousness of 
infringements is considered in many systems when calculating the exact amount of the 
fine. In the Czech Republic, illegal employment is classified as an offence for which a 
natural person or foreign national may be fined up to CZK 10,000 (about €362 as at 22 
January 2009). A natural or legal person who enables the performance of illegal work and 
thus commits a misdemeanor may receive a fine of up to CZK 2,000,000 (€72,375).172 In 
Belgium, the Social Penal Code establishes four levels of administrative sanctions (see 
table below).  
Social Penal Code: sanctions (with additional decimals) 
Level of sanction Imprisonment Judicial fine Administrative fine 
Level 1   60 to 600 euros 
Level 2  From 300 to 3,000 euros 150 to 1,500 euros 
Level 3  From 600 to 6,000 euros 300 to 3,000 euros 
Level 4 From 6 months to 3 years From 3,600 to 36,000 
euros 
1,800 to 18,000 euros 
Belgium penal and administrative fines according to Art. 101 of the Social Penal Code 
Most of sanctions applicable to undeclared work and social fraud are level three or 
four. Most severe sanctions are applied to cases of employment of illegally resident 
migrants or absence of immediate declaration of new employees. Administrative and penal 
fines can never be imposed together for the same facts, the first ones being applied when 
the public prosecutor decides not to make use of the penal sanction. Recidivist offenders 
can be sanctioned by the double. If the injured party is not a civil party in the judicial 
procedure, the judge will order back-payment of social contributions and interest.  
A so called solidarity contribution is calculated by the National Social Security Office 
and forced on a basis of a report of the labour inspector or of a judiciary police for 
violation of the DIMONA obligation (declaration of workers). It equals the triple of the 
contribution corresponding to the applicable minimum wage, by a minimum of 2,500 
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Euros, to which some deductions can be applied. If the worker is an illegal resident, the 
immigration office will ask the employer for reimbursement of the repatriation costs. 
As mentioned before, in order to ensure an increased deterrence effect, several 
reforms have been enacted in a number of countries setting harsher punishment or 
speeding up procedures. Slovakia is paradigmatic on this sense, where the sanction for not 
registering a worker rose from 100 SKK for each worker and working day to 500,000 SK 
in 2004. Spain has increased fines for serious offences (3,126 to 10,000 Euros). All 
companies sanctioned for a very serious offence became deprived of public benefits for a 
period of two years and of applying for public tenders for a period of five years.173 In 
Romania, new criminal offenses were introduced in 2011.174 In Greece, the Act No. 
3966/2011 introduced a new obligation for employers to pay pecuniary fines on-the-spot. 
In Belgium, sanctions procedures of the four inspectorates dealing with social fraud keeps 
increasing since 2008.175 In Italy, the fine is multiplied by the number of workers and 
working days (maxi-sanction). In 2007, Austria increased the maximum fine for violation 
of the obligation of registration of workers in social security from 3,360 Euros to 5,000 
Euros for each worker. Sanctions have been strengthened in many other countries 
including Denmark and the Netherlands,176 but despite this, inspectorates report that there 
is an insufficient application and success of enforcement depends very much on the courts 
capacities to follow up on the cases.  
Other sanctions are sometimes considered to be more effective than fines. Closure of 
the establishment is possible in France, Greece,177 Slovakia178 and Portugal,179 but is 
rarely applied. In Greece, for instance, closure of business was imposed on 20 companies 
in the period from 1 January to 31 October 2012.180 In Italy, if the presence of undeclared 
workers equals a percentage equal or greater than 20 per cent of the workforce in an 
establishment, labour inspectors can order the immediate suspension of the business 
activity.181 
In Belgium, the bank accounts of the offender can be blocked. In France, successive 
revisions of the Labour Code, have added a set of penalties (Art. L.324) which can be 
applied cumulatively for violating provisions on undeclared work, consisting of up to three 
years of imprisonment and up to 45,000 EUR in fines (for instance for use of disguised 
employment relationships), or even up to five years of imprisonment when minors in 
school age or foreign workers in irregular situation are involved or as much as five year 
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prohibition from operating as an employer in the same sector. Deprivation of social 
benefits is also foreseen. 
In most countries, labour inspectors can advert or notify employers to any non-
conformity with the law, such as underpayment of wages. In Spain, labour inspectors can 
equally notify employers to pay social security contributions and even to promote the 
registration of the company.  
Reforms of labour law have also introduced mechanisms turning labour inspection 
into a more effective function, by establishing reversals of the burden of proof and lists of 
indicators for the determination of employment contracts against false commercial 
agreements, legal presumptions of minimum periods of employment when undeclared 
workers are detected on inspection visits and joint liability schemes.  
These later prove to be effective as the main contractor is held responsible for the 
offences or for the payment of fines for violations committed by subcontractors. In Spain, 
a recent law extended the liability of contractors for social security debts of subcontractors 
for the duration of the contract. In Finland, according to Law No. 1233/2006, of 1 January 
2007, amended in 2012, contracting parties are required to ask for and obtain documents 
certifying registration and payment of taxes from subcontractors, as well as compliance 
with collective agreements. The contracting party has to inform its workers’ 
representatives of the use of subcontracting or temporary work. In 2010, more than 2,500 
contracts were examined by the authorities and about half were non-compliant. By March 
2011, more than 300,000 Euros in fines had been imposed.  
Joint liability schemes were also introduced in Austria by the 2009 Customer 
Liability Act and 2011 Fraud Prevention Act. The so called Art. 30bis in Belgium182 is 
paradigmatic on this sense. The developer who pays for work to a contractor or 
subcontractor which at the moment of payment has debts to social security is deemed to 
retain and send to ONSS 35 per cent of the total amount. Where the developer uses a 
contractor that has social security debts at the conclusion of the contract, the developer will 
be jointly liable for the debts of the contractors. The same applies for the contractor with 
respect to the debts of any subcontractor. Given the extent of false independent work in 
large subcontracting chains, Spain introduced the responsibility of the main contractor for 
debts of contractors to self-employed workers.183 
Liability is also attributed to individuals behind enterprises. In the Netherlands, 
estimates have shown that for every 50 - 60 illegal labour brokers caught, 70 per cent of 
fraudulent temporary work agencies are closed down. Considering this, national authorities 
and social partners engaged in a new programme (the Rotterdam project) with the aim of 
getting to the individuals behind these agencies. The same has recently taken place in 
Ireland with inspectors going after individual directors and company accountants.184 In 
Portugal, the labour code sets the liability of the director of a business for the payment of 
fines imposed on the company in conjunction with this latter for breaches of labour law. 
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Sanctions for employers accepting workers from third countries in irregular status 
have become stricter, as an effect of EU Directive 2009/52.185 In most countries, the use of 
irregular migrant workforce creates criminal responsibility both for employers and 
undeclared migrant workers. In Greece, a 500 euros fine is imposable to employers of 
third-country nationals living legally in the country, but that are not able to demonstrate the 
necessary documents at the time of inspection.186 In France these workers can face one to 
three years in prison or fines for unauthorized entry into the national territory. Moreover, 
in Portugal banned undeclared workers will not be allowed to re-enter the country.  
It must be reflected, in any case, that enforcement of sanctions should be 
accompanied by measures for protection of migrant workers’ rights, as recommended by 
the mentioned EU Directive, according to which the employer should be required to pay to 
the third-country national any outstanding remuneration for the work undertaken and any 
outstanding taxes and social security contributions. It highlights that if the level of 
remuneration cannot be determined, it should be presumed to be at least as high as the 
wage provided for by the applicable laws on minimum wages, by collective agreements or 
in accordance with established practice in the relevant occupational branches. The 
employer should also be required to pay, where appropriate, any costs arising from the 
sending of outstanding remuneration to the country to which the illegally employed third-
country national has been returned. It further states that Member States should ensure that 
claims are or may be lodged and that mechanisms are in place to ensure that recovered 
amounts of outstanding remuneration are able to be received by the third-country nationals 
to whom they are due (…) Member States should (…) consider the possibility and added 
value of enabling a competent authority to bring proceedings against an employer for the 
purpose of recovering outstanding remuneration.  
For this purpose, the French National Plan against Undeclared Work 2013-2015187 
directly expresses that additionally to the sanctions for employers, it is important to inform 
workers about their entitlement to compensation even after their return to their country of 
origin.  
Adoption of deterrence measures imposing administrative sanctions that target the 
economic interest of enterprises is being used, like stripping a business’ eligibility to 
compete for public procurement contracts and public tenders (Ireland, Portugal), the 
withdrawal of public subsidies (Hungary188), or the temporary or final closure of an 
establishment (France, Greece, Italy). Naming and shaming measures such as the publicity 
of lists of enterprises that commit gross violations of labour law is equally used. In 
Portugal, enterprises that have committed very serious offences can have their name 
publicized on the labour inspectorate’s website.189  
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When it comes to installment of workers’ rights, effective measures have been 
introduced in the domestic law of many countries. In Slovenia, amendment to the 
Prevention of Illegal Work and Enterprises Act of December 2006 imposed on employers 
that are caught with undeclared workers to conclude a contract for an indefinite period 
with the workers. The employment relationship is formed automatically with no need for a 
judicial decision. Attestation of employment is given to the worker within three days after 
a labour inspector established the facts.190 An attention-grabbing approach exists in 
Belgium for illicit placing, where the worker can force the user to conclude a work 
contract for an undetermined period, if the violation of the law is proved. 
Workers are also sanctioned when involved in undeclared work. This is the case in 
most of the countries when they receive undue social benefits for unemployment, sickness, 
etc. while being employed or for false declarations to public services or when they do not 
declare new employment.  
In terms of procedures, Belgium introduced in 2011 the ePV, electronic reporting of 
infractions available for social inspectorates,191 where all reports are signed electronically 
by inspectors using an eCard and stored in a central electronic archive. A measure to speed 
up procedures was also created, where if the labour auditor renounces to public action or 
does not decide within six months from reception of the “procès-verbal”, the 
administrative authority may follow on with the administrative sanction procedure.192 The 
Programme Law of 29 March 2012 also introduced new causes of interruption of limitation 
of social debts.  
However, even though much effort is being undertaken, sanctioning remains a 
challenge, in particular with regard to enforcement, still problematic when dealing with 
subcontracting chains or cross-border infractions. In countries such as Belgium, 
inspectorates are limited on the recovery of social security contributions since there is no 
joint liability scheme and even if the criminal law provides some mechanisms, such as the 
immobilization of bank accounts or property to recuperate benefits obtained by illicit 
practices, its use is not frequent. 
5. Cooperation and collaboration experiences 
5.1. Cooperation with other administrative authorities 
In order to effectively tackle the multiple features of undeclared work labour 
inspectorates need to cooperate with other actors as set in Art. 5(a) of Convention No. 81 
and Art. 12 (1) of Convention No. 129. The number and nature of institutions dealing with 
undeclared work in Europe is multiple, among which labour inspectorates, social security, 
tax administration, immigration services and to some extent the police, all of them with a 
specific nature and mandate quite varied and in some cases not well known to their 
                                                     
190
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/cases/si002.htm. 
191
 The project won an eGovernment award from the Federation of Technology Industries and it is 
estimated as originating cost savings of 5 million Euros per year. 
192
 Circular No. 12/2012 of the General Prosecutors’ College, of 22 October 2012. Available at: 
http://www.google.be/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=poursuite%20infractions%20sociales%20&source=web&c
d=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.om-
mp.be%2Fextern%2Fgetfile.php%3Fp_name%3D4332732.PDF&ei=lrTyUJ2BHou10QXs7IFw&us
g=AFQjCNFj6N8XhGtQR49Xw160dOHAJQUNcg&bvm=bv.1357700187,d.d2k. 
 46 
counterparts or to a large extent not known from one country to another. Projects as 
ICENUW (Implementing Cooperation in a European Network against Undeclared 
Work)193 identified the competent authorities in some countries, but still an inventory 
constantly updated of all public services working in the subject at European level is to be 
done.  
At country level, France was one of the first countries to establish an innovative 
system of cooperation by setting up an inter-ministerial team to fight against illegal work 
in 1997 (DILTI194) and currently with the DLNF,195 in charge of inter-ministries 
coordination. Since then, other experiences have followed.  
Cooperation on undeclared work as in other issues resides on formal Memorandums 
of Understanding, informal arrangements or participation in joint committees, councils and 
similar structures. Poland, for instance, concluded agreements in 2007 under which the tax 
authority is notified of any unlawful activity revealed in the course of inspection and 
employment offices are informed of workers without contracts found in inspection visits. 
In Spain, a Fraud Observatory involving the General Treasury of Social Security and the 
labour inspectorate was created in 2008 for permanent update of a catalogue of fraudulent 
practices and risk profiles in different sectors, establishment of action protocols and study 
of legal gaps. Previously, at least since 2005, joint plans were already being defined 
between the ITSS, TGSS (General Treasury of Social Security), INSS (Social Security 
National Institute), ISM (Social Institute for Marine) and SPEE (Public Employment 
Service). In Ireland, a joint High Level Group of the Department of Social Protection and 
Revenue meets quarterly to ensure a multi-agency approach to undeclared work.  
France has enhanced its cooperation mechanisms in 2012 by establishing an inter-
institutional experts’ working group to analyze legal complex issues, harmonize 
interpretation and improve work practices by studying in detail complicated judicial cases 
and flaws that can result in failure before the court. New territorial cooperation based on 
cells to fight against undeclared work was established. In Luxembourg, an inter-
administrative unit for combating illegal work set up in 2000 is coordinated by the Labour 
and Mines Inspectorate to conduct unannounced joint inspections.196 In the UK, by March 
2011, 200 staff worked in the JOSETs, teams joining the forces of the Department of Work 
and Pension, Revenues (HMRC) and the employment agency Jobcentre Plus to tackle 
social and fiscal fraud.197 Other countries have created multiagency teams, such as the case 
of the multi-ministerial body to control illegal employment of foreign workers 
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institutionalized in the Czech Republic.198 In Finland, a steering group for the fight against 
economic crime was established in 2000. 
Belgium created a cooperation mechanism involving the inspectorates in the area of 
working conditions, social security and taxes with a strong local impact, where 21 district 
cells meet once a month, headed by the public prosecutor. The cell organizes two days of 
multidisciplinary inspection by the regional intervention groups (GIR) every month, under 
the annual plan defined by the SIRS. In 2012, these cells paid a total of 11,377 controls, 
especially in construction and horeca (see figure below).  
Simplified structure of the District cells in Belgium 
 
The Social Penal Code entitles the federal services of Employment, Labour and 
Social Dialogue, the Control Service of ONEM, the inspectorate of the Federal Service 
Social Security and the inspection service of ONSS to inter-exchange all types of 
information as long as it is useful for application of the law, and serious steps are to be 
taken until reaching a stage where data mining is possible.  
Access to information of other institutions is at different stages of development in the 
EU. If direct access or electronic exchange between labour inspectorates and other relevant 
authorities is used for data mining in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, it is still 
a problem for other countries, particularly when it comes to tax authorities.  
Belgium provided a good practice, of shared databases. The Crossroad Bank for 
Social Security, a sophisticated gateway managed by the BCSS (Banque Carrefour de la 
sécurité sociale), is a federal service with tripartite management which provides to labour 
inspectorates information useful to plan action and investigate cases. More than 2,000 
institutions, including at local level, are connected and more than 722 million messages 
were exchanged in 2011 using the platform. Each institution registers and updates the data 
accessible via the platform. Protected data on reason of privacy is accessible only for the 
central managing institution. Around 40 electronic applications are available for employers 
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relieving administrative burdens, such as Dimona (Immediate Declaration of Employment) 
to register new employees with the ONSS.  
The three Belgium labour inspectorates have access on a permanent basis to: 
- DIMONA (Declaration of Employment and Registration in Social Security); 
- LIMOSA, a database set up to prepare the country for the complete opening of the 
labour market for workers from new EU Member States on 1 May 2009, 
representing an instrument of control in the fight against fraud and the unfair 
competition of foreign workers who accept work at below-market wages and 
disregard Belgian labour laws and regulations;  
- OASIS (Organisation anti-fraude des services d’ inspection sociale), designed to 
combat social security fraud in a systematic and structured way. The data used by 
OASIS is supplied through the information channels of the Crossroads Bank for 
Social Security. The application analyzes fraud indicators like abnormal increase 
or decrease of turnover, sudden hiring or dismissal of large number of workers and 
classifies enterprises in risk levels; 
- GENESIS (Gathering Evidence from National Enquiries for Social Inspection 
Services), a common cadaster of investigation with access to Dimona, Limosa and 
other database avoiding the risk of duplicating inspection by different authorities. 
The software, daily updated, contains information on the inspection visits, reasons 
for the visit and results; 
- DOLSIS,199 a new application (since November 2011) that allows public 
institutions to gain direct access to ONSS data;200 
- The Crossroad bank of enterprises, where all businesses and economic units are 
registered, with identification of responsible persons. 
In addition to this, common tools are shared by labour and social security 
inspectorates to better ensure uniformity of intervention, developed by the SIRS (Service 
d’ Information et Recherche Social).201 Furthermore, a cooperation agreement was signed 
between the federal social inspectorates and the tax authority (SPF Finances) in January 
2010 for exchange of information and at this moment, negotiation with France is exploring 
the possible direct access of authorities from both countries to the information systems.202 
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Countries such as Spain are looking for access to information from commercial or 
property registration services, and recently the General Labour and Social Security 
Inspectorate gained access to data from notaries and land registries. 
Another good example of cooperation exists in the Netherlands. Authorities carry out 
investigations centered on individuals to search for those unemployed who are on benefits 
while working undeclared, by matching the databases of different agencies via a common 
application (Suwinet) with data from municipalities, the Chamber of Commerce, the tax 
authority, and social security. In Bulgaria, the General Labour Inspection Executive 
Agency has access to the register of employment contracts managed by the State revenue 
agency. The Polish labour inspectorate has access to the national register of economic 
entities of the central statistics office, the social insurance institution register and the 
general electronic system of citizens’ identification. 
Many countries organize inter-institutional joint teams to visit workplaces. In 
Belgium, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Romania common inspections with other 
governmental bodies are conducted according to the annual national plan and on ad hoc 
basis. Joint evaluations are also carried out afterwards, and solutions are discussed namely 
as regards to irregular immigrants and their possible integration into the labour market. In 
Italy, the staff of DPL works together with the Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza or Police 
corps in the sectors most frequently cited to have a high prevalence of undeclared work.203  
Referral of law infringements to the appropriate authorities related with fiscal fraud, 
human exploitation, unacceptable housing conditions, and abuse of social benefits is 
another form of cooperation of labour inspectorates with other authorities. As some 
exploitation cases are considered as crimes, labour inspectorates work closely with police 
authorities. In Poland, for instance, the Border Guard is informed of all cases of undeclared 
work carried out by migrants.204 
Cooperation presents some risks if the roles and complementarities of each institution 
are not clearly defined. In the negative scenario, it can lead to confronting work methods, 
rivalry, duplication of efforts and a negative institutional image, plus creating unnecessary 
constraints for employers. To avoid this, it is fundamental to establish roles and mutually 
understand competencies, capacities and limits, as well as keep a constant dialogue. 
Cooperation with actors representing the civil society and academia are not frequent. 
Experiences show good outcomes when they exist. This is the case of a pilot of the social 
Belgium inspectorate with the University of Gant to analyze social fraud trends. 
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The 3D cooperation model 
A model of 3D cooperation was suggested by round-table participants205 as the most appropriate to deal with 
undeclared work, as this is a subject involving many authorities. The model consists of simultaneous and 
interacting horizontal concentric circles, and a vertical pyramid. 
The horizontal concentric circles, such as the waves produced by a stone thrown into a lake represent the 
different actors, from the representatives of public authorities involved to social partners, media, judiciary, 
police, civil society organizations, the academia, who are placed in different angles and are affected by the 
actions committed by each other. 
A good model of coordination demands to consider both the concentric horizontal level and the vertical one. 
5.2. Relations with the judiciary 
In many EU countries, special methods have been developed to allow the inspectorate 
and the judiciary to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with a view to ensuring the 
effectiveness of inspection interventions, as well as the enforcement of the labour law 
through prosecutorial action. In this regard, it is worth recalling the comment by the ILO 
Committee of Experts that the effectiveness of measures taken by the labour inspectorate 
“depends to a large extent on the manner in which the judicial authorities deal with cases 
referred to them by, or at, the recommendation of labour inspectors,” and that measures 
should be taken “to raise the awareness of judges concerning the complementary roles of 
the courts and the labour inspectorate.”206 In order to improve relations with courts, special 
units have been established within the Ministries of Labour to deal with records of 
administrative and criminal proceedings and ensure coordination with the Ministry of 
Justice to enhance the handling of cases. In Belgium, there is extensive formal 
collaboration between labour inspectorates and the judicial system in prosecuting cases of 
undeclared work. Social inspection services and the judicial federal police cooperate in the 
so called mixed cell support unit, created in 2011, that operates in the fight against serious 
and organized social fraud. The cell is made up of four social inspectors from ONSS, 
ONEM and IS, two members of the police, and one statistician of the judicial federal 
police.  
As already noted, the process of imposing sanctions is not always smooth, notably 
when the sanction procedures require follow-up action by a judicial body. Some countries 
have established specific forms of collaboration between the inspectorate and the judicial 
authorities, with the aim of ensuring that the inspectorate’s action is effective. In Belgium, 
the Cheop system provides labour inspectors with access to data on labour law 
jurisprudence and the procedures are sent to the court electronically.  
In France, a monitoring agency has been established within the Directorate General 
for Labour to monitor legal proceedings arising from the inspectorate's actions. It collates 
information pertaining to administrative and criminal proceedings and manages the 
collaboration process with the Ministry of Justice, in order to ensure a better follow-up of 
each case. Public prosecutors are also co-presidents of the Anti-fraud Departmental 
Committee (CODAF), aimed at the operational coordination of the fight against illegal 
work. Regular meetings are held to present labour policies’ priorities, current issues 
existing at the work places, difficulties encountered in the control actions in the field, and 
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also to share records and cases under prosecution in attendance of judgment, and to 
prepare, where appropriate, the participation of enforcement officers at trial hearings.  
In Austria, alongside administrative proceedings, which rely on ad hoc tribunals and 
involve the inspectorate, parallel proceedings also exist to deal with violations of the 
criminal code. Through this process, proceedings are instituted when a labour inspector 
submits documents and reports to the Department of Criminal Investigations or the 
Department of the Public Prosecutor. In any case, the courts must inform the inspectorate 
services of the termination or completion of any proceedings, though not necessarily of the 
court's decision. In Portugal, there are different means of informal collaboration based on 
common training, joint publications and meetings based on a Memorandum of 
Understanding celebrated between the Authority for Working Conditions and the Centre 
for Judicial Studies, where prosecutors and judges are trained. In other countries such as 
Greece, inspectors have the authority to prosecute violators in a criminal court for serious 
offences. However, because of delays in the court system, inspectors often prefer to 
impose fines instead.207  
In France, an inspector is considered to be an agent of the judiciary in certain specific 
and urgent cases. In other EU countries, inspectors are called as witnesses, though not as 
legal experts, whereas both these roles are recognized in Spain. Also in Spain, 
collaboration with the judiciary focusing on specific sectors such as the domestic sector is 
becoming more important. In this sense, the recent Law 36/2011, of 10 October, regulating 
the labor jurisdiction, provided that the Inspectorate General of Labour and Social Security 
may request judicial authorization to inspect domestic premises, if the owner opposes or 
risk of such opposition existed, provided that the inspection is related to administrative 
procedures that subsequently can be brought to the social jurisdiction, or to enable any 
other inspections or control related to fundamental rights or freedoms. A Framework 
Collaboration Protocol between the General Council of the Judiciary, the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security, the Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General of 
State for effective and fast investigation of crimes against the rights of workers and against 
social security is being established, facilitating cooperation channels in the submission of 
reports to the courts and exchange of information. Under Law 13/2012 of 26 December, it 
is anticipated the creation of a special unit for partnership and support to the Courts and the 
Attorney General’s Office to combat illegal employment and Social Security fraud, under 
the central authority of the Inspectorate General of Labour and Social Security. 
In Romania, all sanctions applied by labour inspectors may be subject to appeal by 
the employer or offender. In this instance, the inspection report and its annexes are used as 
proof for the court of justice. The labour inspector is not entitled to make any testimony, 
but the labour inspectorate delegates its lawyers for representation and support of the 
respective cause. The court should communicate their judicial decision to both parts 
involved. As the course of labour law trials can be long and court decisions are often 
delayed, a protocol has established a joint committee composed of labour inspection and 
judiciary officials, to develop joint programs to improve national compliance.  
Innovative approaches in areas not related with undeclared work could be extended. 
In Spain, for example, and within the context of social courts, the action plan for the 
development and implementation of the Spanish occupational safety and health strategy 
(2007-2012) created special prosecutors in each autonomous community to pursue 
breaches of labour laws and regulations. The prosecutors work alongside the trade unions 
and the inspectors, especially on violations related to the prevention of occupational risks. 
In practice, the prosecutors must notify the inspection service when opening any criminal 
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proceedings which have the effect of suspending administrative proceedings. The court is 
also required to provide the inspector with all relevant court documents, including witness 
statements.  
Also in Spain, there is a provision for periodic meetings between the judiciary and the 
inspectorate at the national and regional levels. A circular of 15 February 1994 required a 
strict collaboration between the ministry of labour and social security, the prosecution and 
the judiciary in cases of crimes against freedom as described in Art. 318-bis of the Penal 
Code, consisting of permanent communication between the Head of Provincial or 
Territorial inspection department and the prosecution. Nonetheless, the lack of 
specialization of judges is reported to be a problem.  
In France, there are periodic meetings with prosecutors, but problems of 
specialization are also reported. Belgium has tackled this by having the labour inspectorate 
represented at all levels of the public prosecution system. In other countries, the absence of 
labour courts is mentioned as a bottleneck.  
Overall, feedback from courts on the results of sanction procedures and the delay of 
judiciary procedures, antagonist interpretation of the law and unshared professional 
cultures are challenges reported by almost all of the countries involved in the study.  
5.3. Collaboration with social partners 
On the 2006 General Survey on Labour Inspection, the CEACR pointed out that “the 
labour inspectorate can attain its objectives only if appropriate measures are adopted by the 
competent authority to promote effective collaboration with employers and workers in its 
activities.208 Indeed, social partners have a fundamental role on defining responses to 
prevent and fight against undeclared work.  
In most of the countries they play an advocacy and educative role, such as Ireland, 
where IBEC (Irish Business and Employer’s Confederation), SFA (Small Firms 
Association), SIPTU (Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union) and ICTU 
(Irish Congress of Trade Unions) submit policy proposals to government, educate 
employers and workers on their rights and obligations and in some cases pursue claims on 
behalf of the latter. In Bulgaria, a National Rules for Business Centre was launched in 
April 2010, implemented by the Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association in partnership 
with the Confederation of the Independent Trade Unions. A public council for the 
restriction and prevention of the informal economy was created in 2009, comprising 
representatives of the government control institutions, ministries, social partners and other 
stakeholders. The aim is to achieve better coordination and cooperation at national level in 
tackling the issues of the informal economy. Analytical and information materials have 
been published and disseminated to the target groups, national representative surveys, 
branch and company audits have been conducted, round tables and national and regional 
awareness-raising campaigns have been organized. An information system, including a 
distance learning platform, a forum on the web, a hotline for reporting informal economy 
practices and e-alerts, were established.209  
Collaboration with labour inspection is either informal, following a needs based 
approach, or more often, formalized in agreements. In Romania, an agreement was 
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concluded in 2011 with the Builder’s Social Fund, a private welfare organization 
represented by trade unions and employer’s organizations in the construction and building 
materials industry providing for a multilevel approach, where, for instance, welfare 
services are made available to legal workers only.210 In France, the ministry of labour is 
trying to increase engagement of trade unions in sectorial partnership agreements. Since 
1992, 17 of these agreements have been signed,211 but with few participation from the 
union movement. Similar intention was revealed by the Spanish Government on its 
National Strategy for Prevention and Correction of Fiscal, Labour and Social Security 
Fraud for 2010-2012. In Belgium, a partnership commission responsible to prepare 
tripartite conventions between competent ministries and social partners, foreseen in the 
Social Penal Code (Art. 15) produced good results in risk sectors such as construction and 
the food industry, where national agreements were finally signed in 2012. Tripartite 
working groups were established to discuss control measures adapted to the sectors. Parties 
in the partnership convention have the right to be appointed as civil party in judicial 
proceedings to impose a sanction related to undeclared work or social fraud, if the 
committed facts are of a nature to harm the collective interests it represents.212 
Institutional collaboration with social partners in many cases is set at the level of 
consultative tripartite bodies, taking part in the definition of general labour inspection 
policies, programmes and plans of action. In countries like Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Spain 
and Portugal labour inspectorates meet regularly with employers’ and workers’ 
organizations as a direct requirement of their statutory laws.213 In Spain, a tripartite 
consultative commission for Labour Inspection and social security provides advice for 
action strategies. In Lithuania, social partners also participate with the labour inspectorate 
on the planning of measures to combat undeclared labour. 
Informative and regulatory campaigns are privileged tools to engage in joint action. 
Countries such as Belgium, France, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Poland, Portugal and UK 
have regular action with social partners to raise awareness and to launch initiatives for 
particular sectors or regions, defining objectives, strategies and even mapping targets with 
assistance of employers and trade unions. Campaigns are sometimes initiated by social 
partners and later on joined by national authorities. This happened in Bulgaria, where the 
“Come to Light” initiative launched in 2007 by BIA (Bulgarian Industrial Association) and 
BICA (Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association) with eight media outlets (TV, radio and 
press), was afterwards adhered by national trade union Promiana, the labour inspectorate, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Economic and Social Council.214  
Spain adopted a simple method to better engage social partners on campaigns in 
regions or sectors where the acceptance of undeclared activities is high, by organizing free 
publicly announced gatherings in city halls where the purposes, reasons and methods of the 
campaign are explained, with coverage from local mass media. The use of this practice 
over the years has promoted a better commitment from social partners and even buyers. 
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The approach consisting of the participation of employers’ and workers’ 
representatives on the definition of strategies and programmes or at workplace level is 
being complemented by other initiatives. There are self-regulation schemes for temporary 
work agencies, and social certification mechanisms provided by employers’ organizations 
to businesses complying with specified standards. In addition, there are self-audit 
mechanisms using accredited private inspectors to supervise compliance. In the 
Netherlands, the SNCU, a foundation representing employers and unions, also known as 
the “collective agreement police” checks compliance with collective agreements, through 
specialized “private inspectors” and verification enterprises, with the origin on risk 
analysis or on reports received from a hotline. In 2011, SNCU obtained 6.45 million Euros 
of back payments. These audits can complement the action of labour inspectors as long as 
it remains clear that on the light of Convention No. 81 labour inspection is a public service 
independent from employers and workers, with the prerogative of use of the State 
authority, namely the possibility of imposing sanctions. 
Collaboration with other actors like NGOS’s is gaining consistency, but is still not a 
common practice even if experience proves this could be useful. For instance, in Belgium, 
social inspectorates report they receive useful “hints” on cases of exploitation from 
O.R.c.a. an association for defense of illegally resident immigrants.215  
5.4. Cross border cooperation 
Labour inspectorates are cooperating at cross-border level to control undeclared work. 
The main aim of collaboration consists usually of the exchange of information about 
enterprises and workers from one country operating in the other, but also on capacity 
building by sharing views, experiences and tools. Manuals and checklists are exchanged or 
commonly produced providing information on applicable laws and regulations, 
exemplifying the models used for official mandatory documents consulted by inspectors on 
occasion of visits. Besides informal networks and contacts, bilateral agreements have been 
signed, some in the frame of larger agreements signed between ministries of labour. 
Administrative cooperation concerning application of Directive 96/71 on posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services is a major reason for these 
arrangements. Agreements were also signed in the context of Regulations 1408/71 and 
883/2004 on coordination of social security schemes and on occupational safety and 
health. Such cooperation is common for neighbouring countries or countries sharing 
cultural identities or with expressive workforce flows.  
At EU level, the use of common platforms such as the KSS on occupational safety 
and health has not yet found a match when talking about undeclared work, mainly because 
of the limits imposed by the protection of privacy of individual data, even if a step was 
already taken with the IMI (Internal Market Information System) on posting of workers,216 
a secure online application that allows national, regional and local authorities to 
communicate with their counterparts abroad through pre-translated sets of questions and 
answers, in place since June 2011. 
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At multilateral level, on 18 February 2011, labour inspectorates of 11 EU countries217 
signed the Bruges Chart, promoting a common endorsement on the need for further 
European cooperation reinforcement of administrative cooperation in the fight against 
undeclared work cross-border social fraud, aiming at the constitution of a European 
network. On a smaller scale, a regional network of social inspectorates of Benelux 
countries meets every two years. 
In the EU, some initiatives were created to strengthen administrative cooperation 
between labour inspectorates to fight against undeclared work, as for instance the already 
mentioned ICENUW (Implementing Cooperation in a European Network against 
Undeclared Work) which ended up with the signature of the Brussels Chart, where 
participating authorities committed to increase efforts in the fight against transnational 
social fraud, the Committee of Experts on the Posting of Workers on the application of 
Directive 96/71218 and Project Cibeles (Convergence of Inspectorates building a European 
Level of Enforcement Systems), headed by Spain and focusing on mutual assistance 
between EU labour inspectorates on cross border controls and imposition of administrative 
sanctions. The involved countries219 concluded that steps should be taken to improve 
cross-border cooperation under a general need to regulate the right of access to information 
while guaranteeing protection of personal data.  
 
The project addressed the problem of enforcement of administrative sanctions from a 
national authority to employers established in another Member State, generally considered 
as a major obstacle for the effectiveness of labour inspection, as these sanctions are not 
included in the scope of the Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 
2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition of financial penalties. If 
criminal sanctions can be enforced in another country on basis of the Directive, penalties 
of administrative nature remain mostly ineffective when the perpetrator is established in 
another EU country. 
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Permanent forums or committees for undeclared work such as SLIC (Senior Labour 
Inspectors’ Committee)220 for occupational safety and health or the Committee of Experts 
on posting of workers221 still do not exist, although the latter covers some of the related 
problems whenever a transnational provision of services exists. For example, is the set-up 
of the IMI (Internal market information system), the electronic communication exchange 
platform, is used by the competent authorities for monitoring the posting of workers. In 
this regard, the use of the IMI opens up new horizons to detect cross border fraud.  
Aside of this, the ambition revealed by initiatives for administrative cooperation 
between tax authorities such as FISCALIS is not yet common for labour inspectorates 
dealing with employment and labour relations. This programme set by the European 
Parliament and the Council Decision No. 1482/2007/EC of 11 December 2007 aims at 
improving the operation of taxation systems in the internal market combating tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. Besides training, seminars, working visits for officers, and the 
improvement of communication and information exchange systems the programme 
promotes multilateral controls funded by the EC, where tax authorities can effectively 
investigate cross-border fraud.  
Coordination of social security institutions is also more developed than labour 
inspection, where a set of rules makes the articulation between EU countries more clear 
and based on a legal background.222  
Even if bilateral agreements have become a common practice, there are not many 
experiences going beyond that. Platforms, networks or other forms of multilateral 
cooperation are still not effective. In fact, the majority of international cooperation 
between labour inspectorates (occupational safety and health excluded) in the EU resides, 
though, in bilateral cooperation where multiple agreements exist and informal networking. 
France and Germany signed a cooperation agreement in 2001 for the direct exchange of 
information and joint action. Offices of both countries have regular meetings, exchange 
internships and conduct joint visits in border zones. Similar agreements were signed 
between France and Bulgaria (2008), France and the Netherlands (2011), Poland and 
Portugal, Poland and Belgium (2007), Belgium and France (2003), Belgium and Poland 
(2007), Belgium and Portugal (2009), Belgium and Luxembourg (2009), Portugal and 
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specific issues such as enforcement, work equipment and chemicals. SLIC organizes every two 
years a communication and inspection campaign on selected subjects. Initiatives already cover 
different fields such as construction safety, asbestos, risk assessment, chemical hazards, manual 
handling of loads and psychosocial risks. Labour inspectors of the 27 EU member states are 
commonly trained on occasion of the campaigns and harmonized methods and tools are prepared 
and used. 
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 The Committee was established by a Commission Decision of 19 December 2008 and intends to 
support and assist Member States in identifying and exchanging experience and good practice, 
promote the exchange of relevant information, examine any questions and difficulties which might 
arise in the practical application of the posting of workers legislation (Directive 96/71), as well as its 
enforcement in practice. Similarly to SLIC, the Committee meets twice a year. 
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 Regulation (EC) No. 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 laying down the procedure for implementing regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2009R0987:20130108:EN:HTML. 
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Spain (2003) and many others. In line with Art. 4 of Directive 96/71 many countries 
established focal points or liaison offices to cooperate with sister organizations in the other 
Member States. A limited number of cases exist where these offices provide information to 
the public, for instance Belgium and Luxembourg. On this latter, a “guichet unique” rends 
information in four languages on posting conditions.223 
In some regions, inspectorates are organizing joint visits to construction sites 
established over national borders. Experiences between Spain and Portugal in the 
construction sector were successful to help to dismantle criminal networks of irregular 
migration, where Brazilian workers were being introduced in operation as Portuguese 
nationals, with false ID (see above). This kind of initiative is taken at a more or less regular 
basis in the regions of Galicia-Minho and Extremadura-Beja-Guarda. Similar experiences 
have taken place in other countries such as France and Italy, especially on the domain of 
occupational safety and health. In 2012, an initiative from both countries analyzed 
irregular labour relationships of cruise crews. In given regions, labour inspectors often 
cooperate on an informal basis, given the constant flow of commuting workers, such as in 
Belgium/Germany/Netherlands, Belgium/France and France/Italy. In 2011, for the first 
time, two Latvian companies operating in Lithuania were inspected by both national labour 
inspectorates.224 Informal networking is frequent between Belgium and Dutch inspectors 
with meeting every six months to discuss cross-border issues.  
The “Trueno” Operation in Spain225 
In 2010, the Spanish labour and social security inspectorate launched an initiative in the island of Ibiza, 
involving ten officers of the tax authority, four labour inspectors, two employment assistant inspectors, two anti-
corruption officials and the local fiscal and police bodies to address a case of transnational fraud committed by 
a hospitality consortium managing more than 70 hotels in Ibiza and Mallorca. 
The workers were hired in Brno, Czech Republic, through a ghost company of the group and were 
subsequently posted during summer to Ibiza to work as waiters, receiving salaries inferior to the minimum 
wage and being declared to the Czech social security for only 300 euros per month, violating the Spanish 
minimum wages. The group had around 100 puppet enterprises, most of them without workers and domiciled 
in Ibiza, Palma and Barcelona. 
At the request of the Spanish inspectorate, the Czech labour inspectorate visited the office of this ghost 
company and confirmed that this office was closed without any signal of activity. In parallel, the Spanish Fiscal 
Administration Agency had initiated an investigation for presumed fiscal fraud. On occasion of visits to the 
private domicile of the entrepreneur, inspectors found evidence of contracts with female workers from other 
countries with indicators of labour and sexual exploitation. At the headquarters, files with paid wages not 
declared to the tax and social security administration were found, covering around 300 workers. 
As result of the joint action, commission of several offenses against workers’ rights were detected, as well as 
many offences concerning posting of workers, discrimination of foreign workers, abusive working hours and 80 
false independent workers were identified. 
6. Conclusions 
Undeclared work (UDW) if not properly confronted, threatens to undermine the EU’s 
ability to meet its employment targets for more and better jobs and stronger growth. UDW 
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is a form of social dumping that introduces unfair competition between firms on the basis 
of low wages and the non-payment of social security benefits and leads to working 
situations that violate the rights and dignity of workers. 
Increased taxation, the controversial public perception of the role of public 
institutions, the diminished expectation of decent retirement or social benefits in the long 
run, the under financing of lifelong learning programs, the decrease of public revenues in a 
downturn spiral are all factors deeply rooted in a series of long-term problems which affect 
the size of informality. The European financial crisis is leading Governments to look more 
carefully at labour market problems, where phenomena such as undeclared work can, if 
properly tackled, have a positive impact on the creation of formal employment, improved 
working conditions and an increase of exchequer revenues.  
The international dimension of undeclared work is today a reality. Given the opening 
of EU markets to the free circulation of enterprises and workers, the effects of non-
compliance with national legislation can influence businesses, societies and governments 
beyond a country’s borders. In fact, the costs of undeclared work can influence negatively 
the competitiveness of the EU, lowering working conditions, obstructing skills 
development and aggravating the overall crisis.  
Labour inspection is a public function with a wide and variable mandate in the EU. It 
is the leading service on preventing and fighting against undeclared work. It represents the 
relevant, institution working with social security and tax authorities, which will lead to the 
implementation of laws and public policies depending on the country’s circumstances.  
Even if labour inspectorates are beginning to look more broadly at their mandate or 
new institutions are being formed to tackle undeclared work in countries with a tradition of 
labour inspection on occupational safety and health, there is still much to be done, 
especially in terms of international cooperation. Bilateral memorandums of understanding, 
cross border inspections and different networking are transforming labour inspection 
action in Europe, but a consolidated forum where national institutions could exchange their 
views or even go further on planning common strategies and initiatives is still inexistent. 
Yet some related groups are already addressing parts of the problem such as SLIC with the 
safety and health at work strategy, the EU committee of experts on posting of workers or, 
in correlated domains dealing with social fraud, the administrative commission for social 
security coordination. 
Estimates of the dimension of UDW in Europe do not give a precise idea on the 
extension of the phenomenon. Figures change depending on the method used to gather and 
analyze data, such as indirect methods or surveys. Even more relevant, there is no updated 
source of information on the various heterogeneous forms that undeclared work assumes, 
each one demanding for a specific approach.  
Further than this, national institutions do not use a minimum set of common 
definitions, safeguarding national idiosyncrasies. UDW is neither legally defined (beside 
the EC definition) nor measured (or insufficiently measured) in most of the EU countries, 
nor the forms of social fraud related to undeclared work specific to a country or common 
to the EU are properly identified. In fact, even though there is a broad EC definition, 
national legislations need to provide a better legal basis to define the scope of labour 
inspection in relation to UDW as well as to delimit its responsibilities and liabilities. 
Nonetheless, UDW is regarded as a critical problem in all countries. The lack of 
definitions or standardization may provide bigger flexibility to accommodate the evolution 
of labour market practices, but can also produce problems of enforcement, as there is a 
need to typify wrongful conducts for which administrative or criminal punishment can be 
imposed. 
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UDW is a complex phenomenon that by its characteristics is hidden. If this 
peculiarity makes it difficult for law enforcement, it is even worse in specific 
circumstances when workers render their services at home, such as domestic work, or 
telework. Access to private households is limited in almost all countries to the 
authorization of the householder or prior judicial authorization. In this context, some pilot 
experiences have proven successful, but still do not address the problem effectively, 
especially for what concerns the identification of cases and practical arrangements for the 
inspection visit. This also includes the need to gain access to the judiciary. 
Problems related to UDW are addressed in most of the countries in the context of the 
broader fight against the shadow economy by different national enforcement agencies 
dealing with social and tax fraud. In addition, social partners are active in addressing this 
phenomenon as it hinders fair competition and constitutes an attempt against the values of 
decent work. 
At the labour administration level, while there have been efforts in many countries to 
strengthen labour inspectorates, they still have many financial and human resource gaps, 
especially in those Member States most affected by the crisis, like Greece, Spain, Portugal 
or Romania, where labour inspector’s recruitments, training programmes, salaries and 
benefits have been frozen or even reduced, leading to increased turn over and less 
attractiveness of the career, or in Italy where the current number of labour inspectors is 
considered to be inadequate to the new realities. For the last few years, political pressure 
and economic shortage have weakened the institution and the professional quality of 
labour inspection, exposing the institutional system, as most other public authorities, to a 
continuous reorganization of processes and reduction of staff while at the same time 
increasing their responsibilities. 
At the same time, the economic crisis has strengthened (even with budgetary cuts) the 
institutional role of labour inspection as it has become a fundamental mechanism in the 
fight against labour and social fraud. In fact, the importance of labour inspectorates in 
times of economic hardship where the downward cost pressures increase the need to 
protect workers and to ensure that adjustments to contractual types, working time, wages 
and other working conditions are done in accordance with the law. Court procedures are 
usually cumbersome and slow, and labour inspection represents a flexible service that can 
achieve better results in a more pragmatic way. In parallel, the new labour market needs 
have in many respects limited the labour inspectorates’ scope of action. Inspectors have 
understandably focused their efforts on certain aspects related to the economic crisis (For 
example, mass redundancies, wage arrears) with a risk that inspection visits may not be 
conducted in a comprehensive or balanced way. The impact of this imbalance should be 
evaluated carefully, because it could have a negative effect on working conditions, such as 
occupational safety and health which may be neglected at the expense of crisis-specific 
issues.  
Labour inspection has a primary policy and operational responsibility for tackling 
undeclared work, and this is not likely to change. However, the reduction of financial and 
human resources as well as the working conditions in EU labour inspectorates (particularly 
those affected by the economic crisis) undermined action and motivation. Inspection plays 
a key role but it is not enough. National and creative policies focused on awareness raising 
and information, as well as new preventive forms and specific strategies for particular 
categories of workers would need to be further strengthened. 
There is also a need to improve the policy of incentives for avoiding illegality. The 
lack of law enforcement asks for new sanctions and procedures that could deter infractions 
and create a sound compliance environment. 
In parallel, cross-agency co-operation, in its widest sense, is a strong feature in the 
fight against undeclared work. However, exchange of information between public 
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authorities still remains a big challenge in some countries, due to the protection of private 
data laws or by the weak tradition of cooperation or information systems not responding to 
the needs. If special efforts have been concentrated in some countries to improve the 
cooperation with other enforcement authorities and judiciary, such as the fraud cellules in 
Belgium or the agreement with the National Prosecutor in France, in some other countries 
the exchange of data or the relations with courts are cumbersome and would need to 
receive close attention by the public authorities, as they endanger the effectiveness of the 
labour inspection system.  
Properly addressing UDW would assist in finding an adequate solution to this 
complex issue. This would require clearly defining and measuring UDW and in some 
countries assigning lead responsibility to one specific institution. In addition, clear data are 
needed to improve planning and target action. Operational planning and mapping is 
essential in the fight against UDW. Labour inspectorates should be able to elaborate risk 
profiles to strategize action. For this, they should rely on accurate and updated data. These 
data on UDW should be collected by sectors, regions and issues. Modern software, 
exchange of information between labour administration institutions and other stakeholders, 
and involvement of experts on tracing scenarios enabling to draw mid and long term plans 
on which to base operational field action are fundamental. Where public institutions are 
sharing information, for instance through electronic portals and gateways, labour 
inspectorates do not always have sufficient statistical expertise. The latter, would facilitate 
the use of IT. 
All leading authorities would need to have adequate resources dedicated to such a 
task, and not being continuously downsized. From an operational perspective, a constant 
challenge for inspectorates is to pursuit the fight against UDW with ever-decreasing 
resources, appropriate tools, training and guidance. Therefore, it is important to create 
synergies. Joint activities become highly visible throughout the wider community and help 
to foster tax and law compliance. 
Labour inspectors need to be constantly updated on the practices of the labour market. 
In fact, UDW is not a static phenomenon, as social fraud and non-compliance continuously 
progress. Labour inspectorates should have the analytical capacity to recognize these 
changes and be proactive to adopt new approaches and enter into partnerships with a view 
to giving appropriate responses to the evolving labour market. There is a clear need to 
encourage interaction among all involved parties, in particular with workers and 
employers. 
Labour inspectorates need to overcome the punitive approach as a main focus and to 
look for a balance between prevention and sanction (reminding that, for instance, the 
“maxi-sanction” as provided in some national laws have not had a clear success). It will 
also be necessary that a cross border sanctions system be applied to foreign enterprises.  
At the EU level, the best approaches and methods to fight UDW should be further 
examined with a view to improving the national and regional perspective (specific units, 
multidisciplinary teams, ad hoc groups, specific campaigns, etc.) The cross border 
enforcement of administrative labour sanctions is still a pending issue on the construction 
of an effective system of sanctions in the EU. 
Finally, the EU should consider the need to enhance an EU cooperation of different 
enforcement bodies such as labour inspectorates, tax and social security authorities, with a 
view to preventing and deterring UDW. 
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7. Recommendations for strengthening labour inspection in combatting 
undeclared work 
a) At EU level there is a need for a proper identification of the types of UDW and 
measurement of its size. The opportunities to adopt a common terminology 
following the EC definition, to analyse common practices of UDW in the 
countries, assess the impact of different legal approaches, policies, strategies and 
particular measures, and to enhance cooperation between national enforcement 
agencies should be carefully considered. This might lead to the adoption of an 
international legal instrument on undeclared work.  
b) An effective national policy on UDW should start with a strong commitment from 
Governments, translated into an enabling institutional and legislative framework 
defining the role of the central authority in charge of strategy implementation. 
Roles and responsibilities of concerned bodies and coordination mechanisms 
should be clearly defined, including expected results, time frame, follow up and 
evaluation. 
c) A general approach through social dialogue on UDW should be taken as a 
preliminary step to further strengthen the engagement of employers and workers 
on all cases of remunerated labour activities, with an emphasis on the informal 
economy. Governments should take the necessary steps to improve the economic 
background by creating the conditions for healthy competitiveness for business, 
sound labour market regulations, and social protection policies properly sustained 
and financed. Concerning labour inspection, the main target should be the use of 
existing resources in a more focused and coherent way ensuring the protection of 
working conditions and workers’ rights. In this context it would be important to 
focus particularly on the rights of vulnerable groups of workers such as third 
country nationals. 
d) Appropriate legislative measures should be defined at national level providing a 
clear distinction among different related concepts such as illegality, undeclared 
work, informality, labour and social fraud. This distinction can lead to a clear 
identification of the UDW situation to better allow its measurement and strategy 
setting.  
e) Administrative burdens, where appropriate, should be reduced for employers in a 
way to improve labour law compliance, namely by making registration of workers, 
declaration to social security and payment of social contributions easier, through 
expedite and accessible procedures.  
f) National strategies for UDW should include a strong awareness raising dimension, 
with campaigns aiming at changing the mentality of people on what is not socially 
acceptable, not only because it is “legal” or “illegal” but because of being a 
violation of human rights at work. Both prevention and deterrence measures 
should be included in the strategy. Concerning the latter, an effective system of 
sanctions should exist in line with a solid cooperation with the judiciary. 
Incentives for formalization should be studied and proposed where appropriate.  
g) A set of guidelines on key elements and considerations to define a system-
approach for a national strategy of labour inspection on UDW should be 
envisaged. The EU labour inspectorates can share their common approaches on the 
issue. 
h) Clear criteria of cooperative action among different enforcement authorities should 
be defined. Governments should pursuit on improving and consolidating the 
 62 
networking, providing the policy and legal background so that effective forms of 
cooperation can be established, including cross sharing of data, by safeguarding 
the protection of such data. 
i) There is a need to consolidate common views on inter-agency cooperation. 
Cooperation between different actors should be established through agreements 
and cooperation strategies. Special importance should be given to the collaboration 
with social partners at all levels. 
j) The central authority of the labour inspection system should define a labour 
inspection policy for UDW, taking into consideration that an appropriate balance 
with other areas such as occupational safety and health should exist. Considering 
the complexity and the different scope of labour inspectorates, possible 
specialization of groups of inspectors or units should be evaluated and eventually 
put in place. Labour inspectors dealing with UDW should receive adequate and 
regular training namely on applicable legislation, labour and social fraud, and the 
complementary roles of other institutions tackling similar subjects. 
k) The effects of inspection visits should be enhanced through improved planning, 
including the elaboration of ‘undeclared work risk profiles’. Operationalization 
could rely on the design and implementation of new tools to prepare, conduct and 
follow up the inspection work.  
l) As regards tools, information technologies should have a wider use in terms of 
prevention, detection and publicity. Specific importance should be given to 
combine different databases with a view to discovering infractions at all levels 
(social security, taxes, labour law, occupational safety and health). Improvement of 
the quality and accessibility of data should be a main objective.  
m) Joint inspection actions, particularly between labour inspectorates dealing with 
labour relations and occupational safety and health, social security and tax 
authorities should be developed to get a holistic approach of undeclared 
employment related aspects. 
n) The ineffectiveness of sanctions is a major obstacle for law enforcement. Labour 
inspectorates need to better use their role of informing the appropriate services of 
the ministries of labour on how to improve and make use of international best 
practices. There is a need to improve sanctions procedures and the liability 
mechanisms at national and cross border levels. 
o) The inter-European scale of the problem demands for an EU approach where 
challenges should be discussed, good practices disseminated and joint actions 
envisaged. Forums, sessions for decision makers, platforms, group of experts, and 
exchange of inspectors are possible options for European level action. The ILO 
could further assist in this dissemination and information on good practices. 
p) International action should also take more proactive forms, beyond any formal or 
signed official bilateral agreements between Member States. A European Forum 
on a shared strategy towards UDW, taking into account national specificities, 
should be put in place. 
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Annex I 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW UP 
Round-table discussion on  
Labour Inspection practices for combatting undeclared work 
The following recommendations are the result of a round table discussion with heads and 
senior officials of labour inspectorates from Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and SLIC’s representative held in Geneva on 10 and 11 July 2013. The key purpose 
of the Round Table– which was part of the ILO-EC joint research project “Labour 
Inspection Strategies for Combatting Undeclared Work in Europe” – was to formulate 
concrete proposals for the development of tools and learning products based on good 
practices and needs analysis in this EU.  
During the 2-day brainstorming and experience-sharing, participants formulated 
practical suggestions concerning initiatives that the ILO and the EC could jointly develop 
in order to fill gaps in tools, guidelines, training and networking. 
1. Common Terminology on UDW 
The concept “undeclared work” is defined in very different ways and often together with 
other labour market terminology, sometimes as a synonymous (i.e. illegal work, irregular 
work, illegal employment, unregistered employment, hidden unemployment, “black” 
labour, etc.), even though their content can be fundamentally different. Illegal work is used 
in many countries to refer to more broad concepts, such as in France, or on the contrary to 
undeclared work conducted by individuals with an irregular status, most usually migrant 
workers without a work or residence permit, such as in Greece or Cyprus. Other concepts 
such as “informal employment” are more frequently used in applied research, wherein it is 
defined as the number of people working in the informal labour market, as the illegal 
purchase and sale of labour force devoid of a labour contract and ignoring other laws that 
regulate labour relations.  
Participants consider that the multiple expressions of undeclared work and labour 
fraud and the lack of common definitions in EU member states make benchmarking quite 
difficult and represent an obstacle in moving towards a more coherent and sustainable 
approach. For this reason they recommend to the ILO and the EU to cooperate in 
developing a glossary on undeclared work.  
2. Guidelines on key elements and considerations in adopting a system-approach to 
design a national strategy on undeclared work. 
In the round table, participants presented their experiences and good practice concerning 
national policies and strategies. The following elements were considered as crucial for a 
sustainable system-approach in tackling undeclared work: 
• Strong will and commitment by the Government to tackle undeclared work. 
• Clear framework, including law provisions, defining the central authority with 
clear mission and power as well as roles and responsibilities of concerned 
bodies and coordination mechanisms. 
• Definition of the expected results, time frame, monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms. 
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• Awareness-raising through multi-media campaign to sensitize and promote a 
change in the mentality of people on what is acceptable or not, not only because 
it is “legal” or “illegal” but because it is a violation of human rights at work. 
It is suggested that the ILO develops simple guidelines on key steps and elements for 
designing a national policy and strategy on undeclared work. 
3. Workshop for policy and decision makers  
It is recommended to organize a 3-day workshop for policy and decision makers from EU 
member states on Elements for a National policy and strategy to tackle UDW. The 
programme will be designed in order to combine: (a) structured inputs to frame the 
discussion (based on the key elements included in the above suggested Guidelines); (b) 
presentation of selected good practices; (c) structured experience sharing and reflection. In 
order to benefit from the added value of an international comparison, the ILO will organize 
international meetings with a view to show good practices with among different countries.  
In this, the ILO International Training Centre (Turin, Italy) will be asked to assist in 
these events. 
4. Sharing curricula, training materials, methods and tools on how to tackle UDW 
During the meeting participants shared their practices in terms of the type of training 
and learning opportunities provided to labour inspectors, labour administrators in general 
and social partners on issues related to undeclared work. Several inspectorates include 
training on undeclared work and detection of fraud in both the initial and permanent 
training of labour inspectors. For example, in France and Portugal, during the initial 
training, an average of two weeks is dedicated to inform new appointed inspectors on how 
to detect and use different techniques to investigate fraud, with particular attention to 
atypical forms of work in violation of labour law, such as bogus self-employment. In 
Spain, inspectors are trained on how to cross data sources such as revenues declaration and 
accounting logs; in Belgium, every office has a permanent training group to organize 
regular training on new subjects, for instance on recent legal acts. 
The ILO, jointly with its International Training Centre, could facilitate the exchange 
of practice, curricula, tools and approaches, modeling a “European” expertise in this area.  
5. Guidelines on how to design bilateral agreements and “Vademecum” on 
undeclared work 
During the workshop two interesting experiences were presented by participants 
concerning bilateral agreements, and joint documents of the type “Vademecum” between 
the Labour Inspections and other concerned public authorities of two EU neighbouring 
countries concerning the cross border enterprises. One concerned Spain and Portugal, the 
other France and Belgium. From their practical experience, it is recommended to prepare 
Guidelines with key steps, in order to inspire and assist other countries to adopt similar 
arrangements. 
6. Elaborate a limited set of parameters which can provide “ALARMS” for potential 
undeclared work 
Even if most of the inspectorates produce indicators on the number of visits, at least 
to incorporate in annual reports, data crossing is not yet explored in many cases to help to 
build scenarios habilitating decision makers to set roadmaps, since there is a lack of 
specialists able to build and test models or poor information systems. In fact, not all the 
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countries disaggregate labour inspection statistics on undeclared work and can only show 
the total figure on the number of visits and offenses encountered, while others have given 
particular attention to this issue. For example, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain are in a position to analyze and present variables by regions, sectors, gender and 
most frequent violations. During the round table discussion, the representative of Belgium 
illustrated how they make an extensive use of the data available based on a sophisticated 
software and internal know-how to compile and read statistical outputs and cross data from 
different sources in order to identify areas of potential risk. Crossing the data extracted 
from labour inspectorates’ information systems with other sources is quite useful, as it 
gives empirical evidence to the phenomenon of undeclared work.  
Participants suggest taking inspiration from good practices and elaborate a limited set 
of parameters from different sources to help labour inspection in identifying potential 
undeclared work and help in set priorities and focus visits. 
7. Monitoring trends in sanctions and coherent balance between advice/enforcement  
During the round table discussion, participants debated on the evolving situation, in 
terms of labour inspection approaches and sanctions. On one side, in order to establish 
strong deterrence and discourage the use of UDW, several countries have increased the 
amount of sanctions (for example, Spain and Italy with its “maxi sanction”); on the other 
side, the impact of the crisis on enterprises, in particular SMEs, is making the imposition 
of high fines difficult and obliges governments to revise their strategy (for example 
Greece). Considering the frequent and fast changes in this matter, ILO should continue to 
facilitate experience sharing and consolidate a comparative study on labour inspection 
strategies and approaches in the EU, in the context of the economic crisis, with reference to 
the balance between advice/enforcement and to the use of sanctions (deterrence/economic 
sustainability). 
8. Methods for assessing the impact of sanctions 
As consequence of the trends and challenges mentioned above, it becomes very 
important for EU member states to assess the impact of fines. Some countries (such as 
Portugal and France) have developed methodologies for this purpose and are in the process 
of implementing them. These experiences, when finalized, could be systemized, modelized 
and shared with other countries.  
9. Guidelines on promoting co-operation 
One of the persistent problems is the lack of coordination within the Labour 
Inspection (vertical and horizontal) and between LI and other bodies (public authorities, 
judiciary, social partners, academia, etc). Several countries register a lack of 
communication in particular between Labour Inspection and the Judiciary.  
To try solving this problem, some countries have developed practices concerning 
communication and cooperation among different actors, experiences that could be 
“modelized” in order to be the source of inspiration for other countries.  
Some success for good communication has been identified during the meeting, based 
on participants’ experience, such as: 
• Recognize and value differences 
Each body has its mission, mandate, purpose, composition, modus operandi, 
interests. Differences should be recognized and valued as an asset. 
 
• Fix a common goal 
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In order to benefit from different perspectives, all components should set a clear 
common goal. Cooperation will work only if all bodies involved really share it, 
not if it is imposed from the top as an “obligation” to cooperate. 
 
• Articulate the common goal, objectives and operations  
Cooperation should be able to produce evidence, results and outcomes. People 
should see the advantage of investing time in cooperation; if results will not be 
produced, the perception of “waste of time” will frustrate participants. 
 
• Institutional  Personal 
Personal contact and trust are recognized to be an important part of a sound 
institutional cooperation. Initiatives could be taken to promote personal 
networking, taking example from member countries, such as conferences, joint 
training (Spain, Belgium and France), and joint inspection visits.  
 
Three recommendations concern the adoption of a sectoral approach in tackling undeclared 
work. In particular: 
10. Collect information and samples of campaigns on UDW in specific sectors 
(Construction and Agriculture) 
It is suggested, in collaboration with the SLIC (the EU Senior Labour Inspectors’ 
Committee) to select economic sectors (such as construction and agriculture) and collect 
examples of campaigns run by EU member states on tackling undeclared work in those 
sectors. A template should be designed and sent to member States for this purpose. States 
will be asked to provide a short description of the campaign as well as supportive 
documentation with samples of the material used. 
11. Design guidelines on how to organize a sector-focussed campaign on UDW 
Based on the analysis and systematization of the collected experiences, it is suggested 
to elaborate a guideline with key steps and elements to be taken into consideration in 
designing and organizing a national campaign on UDW in the respective selected sectors. 
12. Organize a workshop for LI decision makers  
The outcome of the above-mentioned activities could be used by the ILO 
International Training Centre when preparing learning material. In this regard, it is 
recommended that the ILO with the assistance of the ITC, Turin organize a 5-day 
workshop for LI decision makers on Elements for a National Campaign to tackle UDW in 
Agriculture and Construction.  
Further suggestions  
In addition to the above listed recommendations, participants discussed the need to 
further develop a set of core competences that a Labour Inspector should have (in terms of 
knowledge, skills and behaviours) in order to be able to tackle undeclared work at the 
workplace. Further discussion and comparative analysis are needed on this issue. The ILO 
and the ITC would develop a European training module with key common elements (in 
term of concepts, methods, interdisciplinary approach, communication, coordination, soft 
skills, etc) on Labour Inspection and undeclared work as a further step in this area. 
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Acronyms 
ASTREES Association Travail Emploi Europe Societé 
CEACR Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
CIBELES Convergence of Inspectorates Building a European Level Enforcement System 
CIF Centre interrégional de formation (Inter-regional training center – France) 
CLS Contrôle des lois sociales (Belgium) 
CNLF Comité national de lutte contre la fraude (National Commission for the fight against illegal 
work – France) 
CODAF Comité opérationnel départemental anti-fraude (Anti-fraud Departmental Committee – 
France) 
COLTI Comité opérationnel de lutte contre le travail illégal (Committee to Combat Illegal Work – 
France)  
ENCCRF École nationale de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes 
(National School of Competition, Consumption and Fraud Repression – France) 
ENUW European Network against Undeclared Work 
EU European Union 
DNLF Délégation Nationale à la lutte contre les fraudes (National Delegation for the fight against 
undeclared work – France)  
DILTI Délégation Interministérielle à la Lutte contre le Travail illégal (Inter-ministerial 
Delegation for the fight against illegal Work – France) 
DPL Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro (Provincial Labour Directorate – Italy)  
DYMIMIC Dynamic Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HORECA Hotel, Restaurant and Catering sector 
IBEC Irish Business and Employer’s Confederation 
ICENUW Implementing Cooperation in a European Network against Undeclared Work 
ICTU Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
ILO International Labour Office 
INAIL Istituto Nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (National Work 
Accidents Agency – Italy) 
INTEFP Institut national du travail, de l'emploi et de la formation professionnelle (National Institute 
of Labour, Employment and Vocational Training - France) 
INPS Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale (National Social Security Agency – Italy) 
IS Inspection sociale du Service Public Fédéral (Social Inspectorate – Belgium) 
IT Information technology 
ITSS Inspección de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (Labour and Social Security Inspectorate – 
Spain) 
KSS Knowledge Sharing System (OSH) 
KIAB Control of Illegal Employment of Workers 
LIMOSA Landenoverschrijdend Informatiesysteem Migratie Onderzoek Sociaal Administratief (The 
international migration information system – Belgium) 
MoU Memorandum of understanding 
MIMIC Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model 
NERA National Employment Rights Authority (Ireland) 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OASIS  Organisation Anti-fraude des Services d’Inspection Sociale (Social Inspection Services 
Anti-fraud Organisation – Belgium) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
ONEM Office National de Sécurité Sociale (Office national de l'Emploi (National Employment 
Office – Belgium)  
ONSS (National Office for Social Security – Belgium) 
OSH Occupational Safety and Health 
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RIIFT  Réseau international d’Institutions de Formation dans le domaine du Travail (Network of 
Labour Training Institutions) 
SFA Small Firms Association – Ireland 
SIPTU Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union – Ireland 
SIRS Service d’Information et de Recherche Sociale (Service for Social Information and 
Research – Belgium) 
SLIC Senior Labour Inspectors’ Committee 
SNCU Foundation for the Compliance with Collective Agreements in the Temporary Work 
Agency sector – The Netherlands   
UDW Undeclared work 
URSAFF Union Pour Le Recouvrement des Cotisations de La Sécurité Sociale et des Allocations 
Famiales (Union For The Recovery of Contributions and Family Social Security 
Allowance – France) 
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